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The Requirement of Death: Mandatory Language in
the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute
Bruce S. Ledewitz*
INTRODUCTION**
American death penalty statutes1 in the post-Gregg v. Georgia
2
* B.S.F.S., Georgetown University; J.D., Yale University; Associate Professor of Law,
Duquesne University School of Law. The author is the director of the Allegheny County
Death Penalty Project.
** I wish to thank my colleague Robert Taylor for his helpful criticism, and all of the
student volunteers at the Allegheny County Death Penalty Project. I would also like to
thank my assistant, Judith Olmstead, for her extraordinary efforts in researching this
article.
1. As of September, 1982, when research for this article was being conducted, 35 states
had death penalty statutes, as follows: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to -59 (1982); ARmz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1301 to -1309, -1351 (Supp. 1981-
1982); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1-190.6 (West Supp. 1981-1982); COLO. Rv. STAT. §§ 16-11-
103 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-46a, b (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§
27.2534, 27.2534.01, 27.2537, 27.2538 (1978 and Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982-1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Burns
1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.015-.100 (Supp. 1980); LA. CODE CiuM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905-905.9
(West Supp. 1982); MD. ANm. CODE art. 27, § 413 (Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101
to -107 (Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.008-.016 (Vernon 1979 and Supp. 1982); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301 to -404 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT..§§ 28-303, 29-2519 to -2545 (1979
and Supp. 1981); NE. Rav. STAT. §§ 175.552-.562, 200.030-.035 (1981); N.H. RED. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5 (Supp. 1981); 1982 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 111 (West) (to be codified at N.J.
STATS. ANN. 2C:11-3 (West 1982)); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-14, 31-20A-1 to -6 (Supp.
1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Supp. 1981); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.02-.06 (Page
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.09-.15 (West Supp. 1981-1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9711 (Purdon Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20, 16-3-25 to -27 (Law. Co-op
Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIzD LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-1 to -41 (1979 and Supp. 1982); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2404-2407 (Supp. 1981); Tax. CODE CriM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37-071 (Vernon
1981 and Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-206 to -207 (1978); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.2 to
.5 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 10.95.010-.900 (Supp. 1981); Wvo. STAT. § 6-4-
101 to -103 (1977 and Supp. 1981). This article will not discuss federal death penalty legisla-
tion. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 417-18
(Powell, J., dissenting).
2. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Actually five cases were decided on July 2, 1976, of which three
upheld state death penalty statutes as facially constitutional. See id.; Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Two invalidated death penalty statutes
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era can be divided into two types, mandatory and permissive.' All
American death penalty statutes guide the sentencer's 4 discretion
in various ways. But upon the satisfaction of the conditions for im-
posing the death penalty the sentencer in some states is required5
to return a sentence of death,e whereas in other states the sen-
as violations of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). Gregg is considered the lead case
because the controlling opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens discussed the facial
constitutionality of the death penalty itself. See 428 U.S. at 168-87. This controlling block of
three justices wrote the opinions in all five cases which are regarded as the authoritative
expressions in those cases. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 230-31, 382 A.2d
442, 445-46, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
3. This is not to say that there are not other significant differences among state death
penalty statutes. For a state by state listing of some of the other differences, including the
role of the judge, the burden of proof and the requirement of jury unanimity, see Gillers,
Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. R.v. 1, 101 app. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Gillers].
Other differences may also be of constitutional magnitude. See id. at 39-74 (constitutional
requirement of jury sentencing at the sentencing.hearing); Comment, Capital Punishment
and the Burden of Proof: The Sentencing Decision, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 316 (1981) (beyond a
reasonable doubt should be the required standard of proof at all stages of death penalty
proceedings) [hereinafter cited as Burden of Proof].
4. In this article the term "sentencer" will be used to refer to sentencing by jury or by
judge, without intending an implication that a statutory requirement of sentencing by a
judge or judges is constitutional. See Gillers, supra note 3, at 3 n.5.
5. It is the sense of requirement that I mean to identify by the use of the term
"mandatory." I do not mean that the Pennsylvania statute is, for purposes of assessing con-
stitutionality, the same as the automatic death penalty statutes that the Supreme Court has
struck down. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. Nor am I making a claim of
unconstitutionality by virtue of the word mandatory. Whether the Pennsylvania death pen-
alty statute is unconstitutional depends on the limits it places on the sentencer's discretion,
rather than a label appended to it. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv.
56, 70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Term]. One student note coined the term "quasi-
mandatory" to define a statute that requires death "whenever an aggravating and no miti-
gating circumstance is proven and forbidding death in all other cases." Note, Discretion and
the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1690, 1709
(1974) [hereinafter cited as New Statutes]. Justice Stewart, speaking for the controlling
justices in the July 2nd cases, used the term mandatory in reference to automatic death
penalty statutes. This article does not proceed with an argument based on the meaning of
the word "mandatory", but examines the actual workings of the Pennsylvania statute and
evaluates constitutionality from that perspective.
6. It is not always clear from the face of a death penalty statute how much discretion
the sentencer is given. Fourteen states have death penalty statutes with language that ap-
pears to order that death be returned under certain circumstances: Arizona, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, New Jersey, Maryland, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. See supra note 1. However, such an enumeration may
be highly misleading. Satisfaction of the conditions for imposing the death penalty may
itself involve so much sentencing discretion as to be virtually unlimited. Cf. Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38, 46 (1980) (Texas jurors "exercise a range of judgment and discretion" in an-
swering three specific questions at sentencing hearing). In Arkansas, one of the require-
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tencer is always permitted to return a sentence of life imprison-
ment.7 This article compares mandatory and permissive ap-
proaches and examines the constitutionality of one mandatory
death penalty statute, that of Pennsylvania.8 For purposes of com-
parison, this article will also refer to the Georgia death penalty
statute,' the death penalty sentencing system most often consid-
ered by the United States Supreme Court.10
Mandatory death penalty statutes are difficult to interpret be-
cause they both differ from and are similar to limits upon capital
sentencing discretion already considered by the Supreme Court.
ments for returning a sentence of death is a unanimous finding by the jury that the "aggra-
vating circumstances justify a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt." ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1302(c) (Supp. 1981-1982). Such a provision could be interpreted to include some
evidence that this article argues the Pennsylvania statute excludes. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 174-207. Furthermore, one can never be sure how a word like "shall" or "must"
will be interpreted by the courts. See Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 660 (Ala. 1980); State v.
Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 24-25, 292 S.E.2d 203, 226-27 (1982) (language referring to a "duty to
recommend a sentence of death" approved though no mandatory language in statute). This
article will not discuss the degree to which language from that of the Pennsylvania statute
might alter the analysis presented here.
7. The following state statutes contain language that appears always to permit at least
one party, judge or jury, to return a life sentence: Alabama, California, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, and Wyoming. See supra note 1. But see supra note 3.
8. The present Pennsylvania statute was amended in 1978. See Act of September 13,
1978, No. 141, § 1, 1978 Pa. Laws 756 (current version at 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9711
(Purdon Supp. 1982)). See Act of October 5, 1980, No. 142, § 401(a), 1980 Pa. Laws 693,
which transferred the codification to title 42.
9. See supra note 1. As will become apparent, my primary interest in the Georgia
statute is the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of it in Gregg. This perspective
does not do violence to present day realities since the statute has stood substantially the
same since Gregg was decided in 1976. But see GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2538 (Supp. 1981) (1980
amendment concerning primarily appellate and post-trial procedures). Cf. Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 162 n.3.
10. Of course the Court has not reconsidered permissive sentencing itself in these
cases. See Zant v. Stephens, 102 S. Ct. 1856 (1982) (question certified to Georgia Supreme
Court); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (aggravating circumstance invalid as ap-
plied); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (state hearsay rules do not control at death
penalty hearing); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978) (review of death penalty must be
on issues as tried); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape unconstitu-
tional); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (improper exclusion of one juror invalidated
death penalty).
The fact that the Georgia system has been subjected to repeated appellate review does
not, by itself, render the Georgia statute an appropriate subject for comparison. It does tend
to suggest, however, that the Georgia statute is the product of a state actively involved with
death penalty issues.
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Mandatory death penalty statutes do not provide automatically for
death upon conviction of a certain offense. Such statutes do not
preclude consideration of all mitigating circumstances and are not,
therefore, necessarily invalid under Woodson v. North Carolina,
11
Roberts v. Louisiana,'2 and H. Roberts v. Louisiana. 3 Neverthe-
less, like such automatic death penalty statutes, mandatory stat-
utes do require death under some conditions, and do not permit
consideration of mitigating circumstances outside those that are
enumerated." '
This article will propose that mandatory death penalty statutes
be understood as an attempt to reconcile two death penalty princi-
ples identified by the Supreme Court, non-arbitrariness and relia-
bility.15 This attempt fails because mandatory statutes approach
non-arbitrariness by the exclusion of irrelevant matters from evi-
dence of mitigation. But the principle of reliability in death pen-
alty sentencing precludes exclusion of any kind of mitigating evi-
dence and requires that a sentencer be permitted to return a life
sentence for any reason, or no reason. This recognition invalidates
the Pennsylvania death penalty statute.
The first part of this article will introduce the Pennsylvania and
Georgia statutes, and evaluate judicial interpretation of mandatory
language in death penalty statutes generally. The second part will
show the conflict between non-arbitrariness and reliability in
Furman v. Georgia"6 and Gregg, and suggest that Chief Justice
Burger's use of the concept of relevant mitigating evidence in
Lockett v. Ohio17 attempted to reconcile these principles. The
11. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
12. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
13. 431 U.S. 633 (1977). The statutes at issue in Woodson, Roberts, and H. Roberts all
prohibited consideration of any mitigating circumstances, which was the central issue dis-
cussed by Justice Stewart in the controlling opinions in Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304, and
Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333-34, and in the per curiam opinion in H. Roberts, 431 U.S. at 636-37.
It is, therefore, not difficult to distinguish the Pennsylvania statute from these automatic
statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 23-24 and 29-31. The distinction does not, of
course, suggest that the Pennsylvania statute is constitutional. See infra note 85;
14. For the argument that valid mitigating considerations exist outside "the character
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense," see
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. See also infra pt. III.
15. For definition and discussion of the terms non-arbitrariness and reliability, see
infra pt. II.
16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra note 1.
17. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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third part will establish that this attempt could not succeed and
that the Pennsylvania statute, which follows the Lockett formula,1 s
does not satisfy the minimum requirements of reliability because it
does not permit the sentencer full freedom to consider all factors
calling for a lesser penalty than death. Specifically, the Pennsylva-
nia statute does not permit the sentencer to consider attacks upon
the death penalty itself; it defines relevant mitigating evidence
without regard for the community's desire for retribution; and, it
requires reasons for sentencing decisions.
I do not claim detachment or neutrality about capital punish-
ment. I am involved actively in the defense of capital cases and in
other activities against the death penalty. The reader will judge
whether this commitment has clouded my judgment.
I. DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE
A. The Pennsylvania and Georgia Statutes
Both the Pennsylvania and Georgia statutes create a bifurcated
sentencing system in capital cases."9 Each statute provides first for
a trial to determine whether the defendant is guilty of a capital
crime.' 0 Once a guilty verdict is returned, both statutes provide for
a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or
more of a specified series of "aggravating circumstances."' Under
18. For explanation of the Lockett formula for mitigation, see infra text accompanying
notes 140-47.
19. For the general procedures utilized in each state, see the Pennsylvania and Georgia
statutory provisions, supra note 1. See also the general description of the Georgia statute
contained in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162-68, 196-98 (1976).
20. In Pennsylvania, murder of the first degree is the only crime for which the death
penalty is authorized. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1982).
At the time Gregg was decided, Georgia retained the death penalty for six categories of
crime: murder, kidnapping for ransom or where the victim is harmed, armed robbery, rape,
treason, and aircraft hijacking. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-63. The availability of the death
penalty for crimes other than some type of murder seems to have been precluded by Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). The death penalty also appears to be precluded for murder
where the perpetrator does not cause, or attempt to cause, or intend the death of the victim.
See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
21. The Georgia statute appeared to provide for the consideration of nonstatutory ag-
gravating circumstances, a procedure subject to considerable constitutional question. Cf.
Zant v. Stephen, 102 S. Ct. 1856, 1859-60 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting from certification);
Harris v. Pulley, No. 82-5246 (9th Cir. 1982); Ex Parte Kyzer, 399 So. 2d 330 (Ala. 1981)
(new hearing granted because of reliance on nonstatutory aggravating circumstance).
1982
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both statutes, a death penalty is precluded unless the prosecution
succeeds in establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence
of one statutory aggravating circumstance. The sentencing systems
differ, however, in their treatment of mitigating evidence. The de-
fense has the opportunity in both Pennsylvania and Georgia to
prove the existence of "mitigating circumstances. 2 2 In the Penn-
sylvania statute, mitigating circumstances are specified, but
broadly defined, so as to include "[any. . .evidence of mitigation
concerning the character and record of the defendant and the cir-
cumstances of his offense. '2 3 Mitigating circumstances are not
specified in the Georgia statute.
In Georgia, the sentencer is given unlimited discretion to return
a life sentence.2 " Although there are limits upon the kinds of miti-
gating evidence that are admissible at the sentencing hearing,2 5 the
sentencer may return a life sentence without regard to aggravating
or mitigating circumstances, or to their "weight" vis-a-vis each
other. There is no requirement that the sentencer find the pres-
ence of a mitigating circumstance .2  The sentencer may return a
life sentence for any reason, or for no reason.
In contrast to the Georgia capital punishment system, in Penn-
sylvania, the sentencer "must" return a sentence of death under
two conditions.2 First, the sentence must be death if an aggravat-
22. In the Pennsylvania statute, the standard of proof for mitigating circumstances is
"preponderance of the evidence." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(iii) (Purdon Supp.
1982). Given the broad discretion accorded the sentencer in Georgia, no burden of proof for
mitigation is set forth. The sentencer is free to vote for a life sentence where there is little or
no mitigating evidence.
23. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1982).
24. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203.
25. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d 666, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930
(1980) (expert witnesses' philosophical and religious evidence of opposition to death penalty
inadmissible); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 533, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979) (no error to exclude cer-
tain types of character evidence). But see Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 644, 647-50, 220 S.E.2d
922, 925-26 (1975). See generally Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 249 S.E.2d 1 (1978), rev'd, 442
U.S. 95 (1979).
26. See Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 293, 299, 242 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1977) ("[m]itigating cir-
cumstances are not a predicate for a recommendation of a life sentence .. "); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 197 ("(t]he jury is not required to find any mitigating circumstance in order to make
a recommendation of mercy that is binding on the trial court ... ").
27. Cf. Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443, 449 (1967) (jury is free to recom-
mend mercy "with or without a reason").
28. The relevant portion of the Pennsylvania statue, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.. ANN. §
9711(c)(1)(iv) (Purdon Supp. 1982) provides as follows:
[Tihe verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least
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ing circumstance is proved and no mitigating circumstance is
proved. Second, the sentence must be death if the aggravating cir-
cumstances proved "outweigh" the mitigating circumstances
proved. The verdict must be a life sentence "in all other cases. "29
The sentencer may consider, and act upon, only evidence that re-
lates to specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 30 Thus,
in Pennsylvania, sentencer discretion is circumscribed both in
terms of the kind of evidence that may be heard and the manner
in which it is to be evaluated.
one aggravating circumstance specified and no mitigating circumstance or if the
jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any
mitigating circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life imprisonment in all
other cases.
It should be noted, that a unanimous jury is not required to return a verdict of life impris-
onment. The required findings of mitigation by one juror ultimately forces the court to dis-
charge the jury and impose a life sentence. Id. § 9711(c)(1)(v).
29. Id. § 9711(c)(1)(iv).
30. While this is the strong implication of the Pennsylvania statute's language, no one
can be certain of the interpretation of the statute until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
spoken. The scope of mitigating evidence may be construed as broader than it would appear
and the mandatory thrust of the sentencing statute eliminated. See infra pt. I, sec. C. Fur-
thermore, the Pennsylvania statute is not entirely free from ambiguity. The statute does not
say that evidence shall "be limited to" specified mitigating circumstances, but rather that
evidence "shall include" specified mitigating circumstances. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
9711(a)(2), (d), (e) (Purdon Supp. 1982). It is possible that evidence could thus be permitted
to go beyond the specified circumstances. In addition, the instruction concerning deciding
upon the sentence, refers to "mitigating circumstance" in weighing, rather than to any miti-
gating circumstance specified. Id. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). While an unlimited interpretation of mit-
igation is possible, it is undermined first by the very breadth of mitigating circumstance
number eight, which was clearly intended to mark an outer boundary of mitigating evidence
to "[a]ny other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant
and the circumstances of his offense." Id. § 9711(e)(8). Second, by the statutory instruction
to the sentencing hearing judge to instruct the jury on "the mitigating evidence specified
.. .as to which there is some evidence." Id. § 9711(c)(1)(ii). Accordingly, it appears that
the defendant is limited by the statutory categories of mitigation.
It is important that the reader understand, at least as a preliminary matter, how the
mandatory nature of the Pennsylvania statute operates to narrow jury discretion. Assume
that a defendant wants to enter a circumstance into evidence that, although it might be
persuasive to the jury, seems to the trial judge not to relate to the defendant's character or
history of the circumstance of the offense. For example, how unhappy his parents will be if
he is executed. See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text. The trial judge would exclude
this evidence and would forbid defense counsel to make any such appeal in his closing argu-
ment. A juror who, despite the court's rulings, can see plainly that the defendant's parents
would be harmed by the defendant's execution and who would like to spare the defendant
for this reason, may not vote for life under the statute unless some other mitigating circum-
stance outweighs existing aggravating circumstances.
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B. Mandatory Statutes In State Court Decisions
Several state courts have considered, and upheld, the constitu-
tionality of mandatory death penalty statutes.31 These statutes
have been upheld on the ground that in fact they are not
mandatory since they permit the defendant to introduce, and re-
quire the sentencer to consider, a wide range of mitigating
circumstances.2
The refusal of state courts even to discuss the mandatory nature
of state death penalty statutes suggests that the difference between
mandatory and permissive statutes is not seen as significant by
these courts. There are two possible reasons why the difference
31. See, e.g., State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126 (Tenn. 1981); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md.
695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980); Houston v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1980); State v. McKen-
zie, 177 Mont. 280, 581 P.2d 1205 (1978). Cf. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187
(1981) (mandatory statute upheld without discussion of issue); State v. Watson, 120 Ariz.
441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979) (defendant may be required to
prove factors calling for leniency).
If the Texas statute approved in Jurek v.Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) were taken literally,
the constitutionality of mandatory statutes would be self-evident. Under the Texas sentenc-
ing system, death was mandatory, indeed automatic, if three narrow questions were an-
swered in the affirmative. See id. at 269. Affirmative answers to these questions could be
considered mandatory conditions for the imposition of death, in the same way that aggrava-
tion without mitigation, or aggravation that outweighs mitigation, are mandatory conditions
for death in Pennsylvania.
Jurek has been interpreted as permitting some type of legislative decision to require
death. See 1975 Term, supra note 5, at 70: "But a statute that mandates the death penalty
upon the satisfaction of certain specified conditions may not be unconstitutional if both
mitigating and aggravating circumstances relating-to the individual offender and his offense
may be considered in the determination that those conditions are met." Id.
However, Jurek has not been utilized to defend mandatory death penalty statutes. The
reason for this may be doubt about its continuing validity after Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978). See Hertz and Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio
and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 317, 332-41 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hertz & Weisberg]; Gillers, supra note
3, at 37-38 n.166. Jurek was reinterpreted beyond recognition in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38, 46-47 (1980) (despite statutory questions, capital jurors in Texas "exercise a range of
judgment and discretion," so that a juror's views about the death penalty validly influence
the answers to these statutory questions).
32. See, e.g., Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 728, 415 A.2d 830, 848 (1980): "We turn
now to a consideration of the constitutionality of Maryland's capital sentencing statute.
That it is not a mandatory death penalty statute is clear. Because it allows for a broad
consideration of mitigating circumstances, it plainly withstands scrutiny under Woodson v.
North Carolina . . . and Roberts v. Louisiana .. " Id. (citations omitted). To the same
effect is State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 130-31 (Tenn. 1921) (jury is not required to return a
mandatory verdict of death, but must consider mitigating factors), and State v. McKenzie,
177 Mont. 280, 320, 631 P.2d 1205, 1228 (1978) (1981 Montana death penalty statute not a
mandatory penalty because it allows for consideration of mitigating circumstances).
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might not be considered a crucial, constitutional issue. First, it
might be that both mandatory and permissive language permit
equivalent discretion. Second, it might be that while mandatory
and permissive statutes do create different sentencing systems,
both approaches to capital sentencing are constitutional."
State courts could interpret the language of mandatory statutes
as permissive, thereby giving the sentencer discretion which is
equivalent to that provided by permissive statutes. State courts
might use either of two theories to interpret mandatory statutes as
permissive. First, the language of mandatory statutes could be con-
strued as permissive. Thus, for example, the word "must" in the
Pennsylvania statute could be interpreted as "may," thereby creat-
ing a statute with sentencer discretion substantially similar to that
of the Georgia statute.3 4 Such an approach would probably be con-
sidered if a state court doubted that the mandatory approach was
constitutional.
An alternative, but more complex theory, would achieve the
same permissive result through expansive interpretations of miti-
gating circumstances. A jury might be instructed, for example, that
mitigating circumstance number eight of the Pennsylvania statute
would be established and its weight conclusive if, for whatever rea-
son, the jury hesitated to impose the death penalty in a particular
case. Such an instruction would render irrelevant the mandatory
language of the Pennsylvania statute. 5 No doubt jury instructions
could be written that would indicate clearly a jury's absolute dis-
cretion to return a life sentence. If such instructions were given,
the constitutionality of a mandatory statute would be subsumed
under the issue of the constitutionality of permissive death penalty
statutes.3 6
33. I shall take up the latter idea in pt. II. For now, I will examine the constitutional-
ity of mandatory statutes from the perspective that mandatory and permissive statutes are
equivalent.
34. See Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 660 (Ala. 1981).
35. There is no way to be certain how the state courts that have affirmed mandatory
statutes viewed the relationship between mandatory language and the scope of mitigating
circumstances. Tennessee appears to define mitigating circumstances narrowly. See, e.g.,
Houston v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267, 275 (Tenn. 1980) (evidence of effect of execution on par-
ents and society irrelevant). Idaho may be flirting with a broader view. See, e.g., State v.
Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 415 n.7, 631 P.2d 187, 197 n.7 (1981) (Lockett v. Ohio requires "un-
limited mitigation") but neither state relates the scope of mitigation to the issue of the
mandatory nature of the death penalty statute at issue.
36. For reasons I allude to briefly at the conclusion of this article, I do not consider
1982
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Devising clear jury instructions would not be an easy task how-
ever, if the apparently contradictory language of the death statute
were read to the jury. The United States Supreme Court suggested
in Gardner v. Florida 3 that because "death is a different kind of
punishment,' '8 8 the procedures by which a death sentence is im-
posed must be especially reliable. 9 Thus, in Gardner, a defendant
could not be sentenced to death based in part on information con-
tained in a secret pre-sentence report, even though such a proce-
dure might well be permissible in a non-capital case. There was too
great a risk that on the basis of a secret report, "critical unverified
information [might] be inaccurate and determinative .... -40 The
same concern for reliable sentencing procedures led the Supreme
Court to vacate death sentences in two cases in which it was not
clear whether the sentencer was permitted to rely on the key miti-
gating factors that were admitted into evidence.4' The fact that the
mitigating information was before the sentencer did not validate
the proceedings. In another case, Eddings v. Oklahoma,2 the state
death penalty statute did permit full consideration of the mitigat-
ing evidence at issue." The sentence was vacated nevertheless, be-
cause the sentencer apparently thought the statute precluded con-
sideration of the evidence." The risk of mistaken interpretation by
the constitutionality of permissive statutes to be closed. Nevertheless, permissive statutes
were approved on their face in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976).
37. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
38. Id. at 357.
39. For further discussion, and definition of this concept of reliability, see infra notes
137-39 and accompanying text.
40. 430 U.S. at 359 n.10.
41. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (absence of direct proof that defendant
intended to cause death, defendant's comparatively minor role, and defendant's youth not
permitted to affect sentencing decision); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 640 (1978) (youth, coopera-
tion with police, drug problem, and lack of proof of participation in actual murder not per-
mitted to affect sentencing decision).
42. 102 S.Ct. 869 (1982).
43. Id. at 876 n.10.
44. Justice Powell noted that the trial judge concluded "as a matter of law" he could
not consider evidence of violence in the defendant's family history. Id. at 875 (emphasis in
original). The sentencer is required "to listen" to any mitigating evidence presented by the
defendant. Id. at 876 n.10. Cf. Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1981) (sen-
tencer must not be instructed to ignore admitted mitigating evidence); but see State v.
Holtan, 205 Neb. 314, 287 N.W.2d 671 (1980) (evidence admitted, but unclear it was consid-
ered). The apparent refusal of state courts to consider evidence as mitigating unless it repre-
sents almost a legal excuse for murder is a widespread problem. See State v. Britson, 130
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the sentencer of his responsibility was too great."
Interpreting a mandatory statute as permissive would create the
same risk of ambiguity concerning the sentencer's understanding
of his role that was present in Eddings. A state appellate court is
the final word on what a statute means," but cannot be the final
word on what a statute seems to mean to a jury.47 Arguably, the
Pennsylvania statute appears to limit sentencing discretion. If the
statute were read to a jury, the jury might attempt to follow it
despite instructions to the contrary. If a death penalty requires an
absence of ambiguity to be valid,"' curative instructions would not
necessarily satisfy the reliability requirement of Gardner.49 Thus
mandatory statutes interpreted as permissive might have serious
constitutional flaws.
II. THE ROLE OF MANDATORY LANGUAGE
One may anticipate future attempts by courts to interpret
mandatory death penalty statutes, including that of Pennsylvania,
with due regard for their mandatory language. Notwithstanding
that mandatory statutes could be validly interpreted as permissive,
courts are likely to recognize, and give meaning to, the apparent
difference between mandatory and permissive statutes. Mandatory
language in death penalty statutes can be understood as an at-
tempt to reconcile the concern for reliability in capital sentencing
Ariz. 380, 636 P.2d 628 (1981) (intoxication is a mitigating circumstance only if the condi-
tion impairs the defendant's ability to appreciate wrongfulness of the act). Cf. State v.
Steelman, 126 Ariz. 19, 612 P.2d 475 (1980) (mental state did not "counterbalance" killings).
45. "Woodson and Lockett require us to remove any legitimate basis for finding ambi-
guity concerning the factors actually considered by the trial court." Eddings, 102 S. Ct. at
878 (O'Connor, J.@ concurring).
46. There are exceptions well beyond the scope of this article. See Standard Oil Co. of
Cal. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
47. I presume that such potential confusion would present more of a problem in jury
sentencing than in sentencing by trial court although Eddings causes one to wonder. Cf.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976).
48. See supra note 45.
49. I assert that this could be a constitutional issue despite the fact that although the
same issue appears to be present in the Texas statute, that did not disturb the Supreme
Court in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), nor cause comment by the majority in Adams
v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). See Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Com-
panion Cases, 26 CATH. U.L. REv. 1 (1976); Dix, Administration of the Texas Death Pen-
alty Statutes: Constitutional Infirmities Related to the Production of Dangerways, 55 TEx.
L. REv. 1343 (1977). But see Adams, 448 U.S. at 54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cf. supra
note 32.
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with the desire to reduce arbitrary sentencing results.50 The impor-
tance of sentencing discretion in Supreme Court death penalty de-
cisions should convince state courts to interpret mandatory stat-
utes in ways that recognize their potential contribution to death
penalty theory.5"
50. There is little doubt that mandatory statutes represented a legislative response to
the assumed requirements of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 599-600 (ambiguity of Furman's multiple opinions engendered a series of con-
tradictory state legislative responses); id. at 599 n.7 (Ohio dropped permissive sentencing
after Furman was announced). See also England, Capital Punishment in the Light of Con-
stitutional Evolution: Analysis of Distinctions Between Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 596, 601 (1977). Cf. Burden of Proof, supra note 3, at 331 n.87 (legislative at-
tempt to restrict capital jury sentencing discretion). State courts have also attempted to
reduce sentencing discretion to comply with assumed constitutional requirements. See, e.g.,
State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1977). Cf. Richmond v. Cardwell, 450 F.
Supp. 519 (D. Ariz. 1978).
Pennsylvania is no exception to the general trend that sought to comply with Furman
through some type of mandatory death penalty statute. See 1975 Commonwealth of Pa.
Legislative Journal-Senate 1152 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1973) (remarks by Senator Cianfrani
that automatic death penalty statute was sought originally as a way "to get around"
Furman). The statute that emerged was similar in its mandatory approach to the Ohio stat-
ute struck down in Lockett. That is, death was required if an aggravating circumstance but
no mitigating circumstance was established. See Act of Mar. 26, 1974, No. 46; § 3, 1974 Pa.
Laws 214 (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (Purdon Supp. 1982)); Lockett,
438 U.S. at 611. The 1974 Pennsylvania death penalty statute was invalidated in 1977 in
Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 382 A.2d 442 (1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914
(1978), but because of limitations on mitigating circumstances. When the Pennsylvania
death penalty was reenacted in 1978, the mandatory language was retained, although for
reasons that are unclear, the "shall" used in 1974 was changed to "must" in 1978. Act of
Sept. 13, 1978, No. 141, § 1, 1978 Pa. Laws 756 (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
9711 (Purdon Supp. 1982)). See also supra note 29. The present Pennsylvania statute was
examined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1981, in Commonwealth v. Story, 497 Pa.
273, 440 A.2d 488 (1981), but neither the opinion by Justice Roberts, joined by Justices
O'Brien and Wilkinson, nor the concurrence by Justice Nix mentioned the mandatory lan-
guage of the statute. The death penalty was invalidated on the ground of retroactive appli-
cation in violation of legislative intent. Justice Larsen in dissent, joined by Justices Flaherty
and Kauffman, would have affirmed the defendant's death penalty, but also did not mention
the issue of mandatory language. Certainly nothing in this history suggests that mandatory
language in the death penalty statute is the result merely of the carelessness or poor
drafting.
51. The obligation of state courts to give effect to the legislative decision about sen-
tencing discretion goes beyond the general rule that courts are to interpret statutes by refer-
ence to the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1926 (Purdon Supp.
1982). As Justice Stewart emphasized in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the validity
of the death penalty depends upon "contemporary standards," one important component of
which is the judgment of a "democratically elected legislature." Id. at 175. Thus, there well
may be an eight amendment foundation for narrow construction of death penalty statutes.
Cf. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414-15, 631 P.2d 187, 196 (1981) (statutory provision
that court "shall" set forth mitigating factors considered, is to be interpreted strictly).
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A. Furman v. Georgia: Arbitrariness
While Furman v. Georgia6 did not invalidate the death penalty
per se, a five justice majority s issued per curiam orders that invali-
dated existing death penalty statutes.54 Each of the five justices in
the Furman majority wrote his own opinion ." Thus, generalization
is difficult. Nevertheless, it has been suggested by commentators,5"
and the various opinions indicate, that existing death penalty stat-
utes were fatally afflicted by arbitrariness. 7 Arbitrariness was a
flaw not only in the general administration of the death penalty,
but also in the decision of the senencer to impose death.
Of the five justices voting to overturn, only Brennan and Mar-
shall would have found the death penalty per se cruel and unusual
punishment.' 8 Justice Brennan identified several factors in an
eighth amendment test, of which arbitrary infliction was one im-
portant consideration. By arbitrary, Justice Brennan appeared to
52. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
53. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall.
54. On the day Furman was decided, the Court vacated death sentences in twenty-six
states. See Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972); Order of June 29, 1972, 408 U.S.
at 933-40 (1972) (death penalty judgments vacated on authority of Stewart). In all, the
death penalty statutes of thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia were invalidated.
See Furman, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
55. 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). The dissenters also each wrote, although they joined each others opinion, with
the exception of Justice Blackmun's "personal ... comments," id. at 405 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id. at 375 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972
SuP. CT. REv. 1, 24-25 (describing "analytic" approach of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and
White); New Statutes, supra note 5, at 1690-99; The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv.
L. REv. 57, 99 (1978); Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Pro-
cess For Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1149 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Super Due
Process].
57. What follows is an analysis of what the Justices in the Furman majority appeared
to mean by the concept of arbitrariness or its equivalent. I do not discuss the lack of strong
empirical evidence for what appeared to be, at least in this regard, criticisms of the death
penalty as applied. See New Statutes, supra note 5, at 1693-95. Either the Justices consid-
ered the facts of the matter clear beyond dispute, or the Justices were actually condemning
a certain type of statute per se. See id. at 1695-97. Since no empirical evidence of non-
arbitrary infliction of the death penalty was required to sustain death penalty statutes in
Gregg, Proffitt, or Jurek, this latter explanation seems plausible. A facial challenge renders
the discussion of forms of discretion, mandatory or permissive, that much more critical.
58. 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring). But arbitrariness was not presented by Justice
Brennan as the only, or even major reason for his vote in Furman:
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mean the selection 60 for death of only a very small number of those
deserving to die, without any rational justification for differing
treatment."1 Justice Marshall, in contrast, examined not arbitrari-
ness but discrimination in the infliction of the death penalty.
e2
However, the two concepts are used in complementary fashion. In
Marshall's view, from among the pool of "just-as-guilty person[s],"
"the poor and the members of minority groups" are selected for
death while the rich and well-connected are not.6 3 Justice Brennan
would certainly have agreed that such a selection process did not
represent a rational policy for differentiation. Both Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall mentioned discretionary jury imposition of the
death penalty as part of the selection process deemed arbitrary in
the one opinion64 and discriminatory in the other.
65
The other three concurring Justices, Douglas, Stewart, and
White, did not conclude that the death penalty was unconstitu-
tional per se, but only that it was being applied in an unconstitu-
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted
arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no
reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively then some less
severe punishment, then the continued infliction of either punishment violates the
command of the [Cruel and Unusual Punishment] Clause that the State may not
inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.
Id. at 282. The principles of severity and non-arbitrariness are both grounded in the obliga-
tion of the state to punish consistently with "human dignity." Id. at 270-74. Justice Bren-
nan then applied his test to find the death penalty unconstitutional. Id. at 282-305 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 276-77, 291 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. As in the case of Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall relied upon the discriminatory
imposition of capital punishment as only part of his reason for voting with the majority in
Furman. Justice Marshall found that the death penalty was excessive, unnecessary, and
abhorrent to currently existing moral values. Id. at 358, 369 (Marshall, J., concurring). See
also id. at 332-33 (Marshall, J., concurring) (Marshall's "test" of capital punishment's valid-
ity). Discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty was used by Justice Marshall to
show that an informed citizenry would condemn capital punishment. Id. at 363-64 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 366 (Marshall, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[t) his Court has held that juries may, as they
do, make the decision whether to impose a death sentence wholly unguided by standards
governing that decision." (citations omitted)). Discretionary jury sentencing was only one
part of the capital selection process Justice Brennan condemned. See id. at 291-95 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring) (absolute jury discretion to impose death pen-
alty is "an open invitation" to discrimination). Justice Marshall condemned other aspects of
the selection process for capital punishment as well. See id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
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tional manner. Of the three, Justice Douglas merged the objections
of discrimination and arbitrariness in the selection for death."'
Justice Douglas argued that the eighth amendment requires that
the death penalty "not [be] applied sparsely, selectively and spot-
tily to unpopular groups. '6 7 The "seeds" of such discrimination
and arbitrariness were sowed in McGautha v. California," which
approved unlimited jury discretion in the imposition of death
sentences.e9
Given their roles in subsequent death penalty cases, Justices
White and Stewart may be said to have had the determining word
in Furman. Justice White did not use the word arbitrary, but
found the systm of jury death penalty sentencing to be unconstitu-
tional because "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not. '7 1 Such a system serves no coherent legislative policy.72 Jus-
tice Stewart suggested that those defendants who do receive the
death penalty represent "a capriciously selected random handful"
from among a much larger group of defendants, "many just as rep-
rehensible," who do not receive the death penalty75 Both Justices
White and Stewart described sentencing discretion as an impor-
66. Justice Douglas also argued that the infrequency of imposition of capital punish-
ment represented a de facto rejection of the sanction by society. See id. at 245 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
67. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring). By referring to the spotty imposition of the
death penalty, Justice Douglas appears to mean that even racial and class bias do not ac-
count completely for the imposition of the death penalty upon some defendants, but not
upon others. In some percentage of cases, even defendants who are poor or members of
minority groups are spared, but for no reason that is apparent. See id. at 253 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("[p]eople live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12").
68. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
69. Furman, 408 U.S. at 248-49 n.11 (Douglas, J., concurring).
70. Justice White has authored influential opinions about limiting the application of
the death penalty to cases in which death occurred, excluding cases in which the defendant
did not cause death, attempt to cause death, or intend to cause death. See Enmund v. Flor-
ida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape
unconstitutional - plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 621-28 (1978) (White,
J., concurring). Justice Stewart, of course, authored the opinions in the July 2nd cases that
are considered authoritative. See supra note 2. Furthermore, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 188 (1976), Justice Stewart cited to Justice White's and to his own concurrence in
Furman. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
71. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
72. Justice White's primary objection to the death penalty was that the extreme infre-
quency of its imposition rendered improbable its value to any penalogical goal of the crimi-
nal justice system. Id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tant part of the arbitrariness of the system of capital
punishment.
7 4
The suggestion that a punishment is arbitrary, and hence uncon-
stitutional, unless there is a reason that juries impose it in some
cases and not in others, is an unusual requirement. Generally in
the legal system there is recognition that jury sentencing is a
source of ad hoc judgment.7 The general acceptance of inconsis-
tent or unprincipled verdicts76 is a recognition that juries some-
times temper "the harshness of the law and. . . bring community
judgment to bear . . . .", Normally, the defendant who deserves
punishment cannot complain because others, who also deserve
punishment, do not receive the same treatment.7 8 A serious com-
mitment to reasoned choice in capital cases thus might have un-
dermined all death penalty sentencing. Notwithstanding their lan-
guage in Furman, however, Justices Stewart and White did not
insist on a meaningful basis for all death penalty decisions.
74. Justice White maintained that "the policy of vesting sentencing authority prima-
rily in juries" achieved its aim of representing community values so well that capital punish-
ment had "run its course." Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stewart referred re-
peatedly to the "imposition" of the death penalty, and concluded that the death penalty is
"wantonly and freakishly imposed." Id. at 308-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
75. See generally, Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 168 (1972). Generally, no attempt is made to force logic on the jury. See United States
v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). Rather, the jury is recognized as a source of commu-
nity values. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
76. The acceptance of jury verdicts that are internally inconsistent as between differ-
ent criminal counts is well established. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932) (jury
may grant clemency). See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 259 (1968). For a recent case ac-
cepting internally inconsistent verdicts in a bench trial, see People v. O'Malley, 108 Ill. App.
3d 823, 439 N.E.2d 998 (1982). This view may represent the modern trend. See United
States v. West, 549 F.2d 545 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977); Commonwealth v.
Harris, 239 Pa. Super. 603, 360 A.2d 728 (1976), affd by evenly divided court, 488 Pa. 141,
411 A.2d 494 (1979); Commonwealth v. Fox, 259 Pa. Super. 565, 393 A.2d 970 (1978).
77. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
78. This principle is illustrated by the majority rule that one defendant may not at-
tack his conviction on the ground that an acquitted co-defendant logically should have been
convicted as well. See, e.g., United States v. Odom, 377 F.2d 853, 858 (5th Cir. 1967) ("no
vested right" in conviction of co-defendant); Quinn v. People, 96 Ill. App. 2d 382, 238
N.E.2d 619 (1968) (acquittal of other parties does not relieve defendant of his responsibil-
ity). See also Van Der Haag, Comment on Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-
Collar Criminals, 73 J. CauM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 764, 767 (1982); Lempert, Desert and De-
terrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 1177, 1178-79 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Lempert].
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B. Gregg v. Georgia: Reliability
Gregg v. Georgia, and four other cases decided the same day,
rejected the notion that the death penalty was per se unconstitu-
tional, except in the instance of an automatic death sentence upon
conviction for certain crimes. A plurality composed of Justice
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens announced opinions that have been
interpreted as the authoritative view in these five cases.7" The plu-
rality upheld the "guided discretion" statutes of Georgia, Texas,
and Florida while overturning the automatic death penalty stat-
utes of North Carolina and Louisiana.
80
The Georgia, Texas, and Florida statutes were declared to have
satisfied Furman's arbitrariness objection." In reviewing the Geor-
79. See supra note 2.
80. Liebman and Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the
"Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder As A Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 759-60 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Liebman and Shepard) (the July 2nd cases demonstrate that the death
penalty is constitutional when sentencer is provided "adequate individualized information
and is guided by clear and objective standards" and sentence "is not imposed
mandatorily"); Note, The Constitutionality of Mandatory Death Penalty For Life-Term
Prisoners Who Murder, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 636, 637 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mandatory
Death Penalty]; Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 31, at 320. See generally Note, Capital Pun-
ishment: A Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52 NoTRs DAME LAW. 261 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Recent Supreme Court Decisions].
81. Deciding that these particular death penalty statutes satisfied the eighth amend-
ment objections raised in Furman was only part of the decisions in Gregg, Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Court, through the
Stewart-Powell-Stevens plurality, also decided that the death penalty was not per se uncon-
stitutional, thereby resolving the issue that had been left open in Furman, Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 168-87. See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text. Cf. infra note 98. This resolution
was simply repeated in Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247, and Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268.
In deciding the per se issue, Justice Stewart applied two tests that the eighth amend-
ment apparently poses for a criminal sanction: whether the sanction meets society's "evolv-
ing standards of decency," Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting the plurality opinion in Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); and whether the sanction comports with the "dignity of
man," Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100). Capital punishment passed
both tests. In terms of evolving standards, the death penalty's long history of acceptance,
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-79, the post-Furman legislative landslide to re-enact the death pen-
alty, id. at 179-80, one statewide referendum, id. at 181, and the continuing willingness of
juries to impose the penalty at a substantial rate, id. at 181-82, demonstrated community
support. The death penalty was viewed as not violative of the concept of human dignity
because of the penalty's penalogical justifications: retribution and deterrence. Id. at 183.
Justice Stewart turned then to the proportionality of capital punishment to murder and
concluded that at least when a defendant takes life deliberately, the death penalty is not
"invariably disproportionate to the crime." Id. at 187. Cf. Liebman and Shepard, supra note
80, at 772 (alternative analytical framework).
I will return to Justice Stewart's per se conclusions, particularly that concerning retri-
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gia statute, 2 Justice Stewart argued that it satisfied the need for
"evenhanded justice"83 in part because the jury was to be "given
guidance in its decisionmaking" 84 through "clear and objective" ag-
gravating circumstances to be weighed against mitigating circum-
stances, 8 and in part because of appellate review of the propor-
bution. See infra notes 138-244 and accompanying text. My interest here is to demonstrate
the way in which the guided discretion statutes, particularly that of Georgia, were found to
satisfy Furman's objections to the death penalty as applied. The reader should note, how-
ever, that Justice Stewart's per se justifications of the death penalty are based mostly on
retribution. But see Super Due Process, supra note 56, at 1145. Deterrence is a slim need
that Justice Stewart admits is unproved, see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185 (no convincing empirical
evidence one way or the other). Actually, the evidence that capital punishment does not
deter is much more convincing than is evidence on the other side and was when Gregg was
decided. See Lempert, supra note 78, at 1196-1221 (summarizing empirical research). Jus-
tice Stewart's claim that for some, "the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deter-
rent," in the face of empirical investigation even he calls "inconclusive" is a demonstration
of the power of faith over reason, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-86. In any event, even if the matter
of deterrence were viewed merely as uncertain, as Justice Stewart says, it would seem to
follow that deterrence is not available as a penalogical justification that shows the death
penalty is more than "gratuitous inflictions of suffering." Id. at 183. See Review of Supreme
Court Decisions, supra note 80 at 279.
82. Having co'ncluded that the death penalty is not always unconstitutional, Justice
Stewart then considered the constitutionality of the Georgia statute. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187-
207. For a discussion of the limited application of the decision that the death penalty is not
always unconstitutional, see Mandatory Death Penalty, supra note 80, at 647. The plural-
ity's approach to the death penalty statutes in all five July 2nd cases was to examine the
procedures whereby death penalty sentences are arrived at and reviewed in order to deter-
mine whether arbitrariness had been eliminated. See Gregg; Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
247-60 (1976) (approving Florida procedures); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-77 (1976)
(approving Texas procedures); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285-305 (1976)
(disapproving North Carolina procedures); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331-36
(1976) (disapproving Louisiana procedures). This methodology of detailed examination of
sentencing procedures is justified by the "uniqueness" of the death penalty as a sanction,
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, and the concommitant need to ensure "proportionate and appropri-
ate punishment." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 n.39. Professor Radin has referred to the
Court's concern with death penalty procedures as eighth amendmendment "super due pro-
cess." See Super Due Process, supra note 56, at 1149-50.
83. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 n.36 (quoting Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in
Furman, 408 U.S. at 398-99).
84. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192-93.
85. Id. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974).
The necessity of guided discretion of jury sentencing was one reason that automatic death
penalty statutes were invalidated in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). The omission of any sentencing guidelines invited
arbitrary jury nullification. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335-36.
The other reasons for the invalidation were said in Woodson to concern the incompatibility
of an automatic death penalty (the plurality referred to an automatic death penalty statute
as "mandatory," see Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289; cf. supra note 5) with contemporary societal
standards, and the failure of automatic death penalty statutes to allow consideration of "rel-
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tionality of death sentences."0 Such procedures "reduce the
likelihood that [a jury] will impose a sentence that fairly can be
called capricious or arbitrary, 8 7 and provide the "meaningful ba-
sis" for selection that was required by Furman.8
As has been argued by others, 9 the plurality's approach reduces
the scope of arbitrary decision-making, but does not necessarily
eliminate the flaw of comparable defendants receiving different
penalties.9" Not only does essentially unlimited discretion in selec-
tion exist at the several executive stages,91 but, as alluded to ear-
evant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant." Woodson, 428 U.S.
at 303. The plurality viewed the Louisiana statute in similar terms. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at
332-36. The plurality also condemned the Louisiana practice of instructing the jury on lesser
included offenses whether warranted by the evidence or not. The Supreme Court reiterated
this criticism by way of dictum in Hopper v. Evans, 102 S. Ct. 2049, 2053 (1982). Aside from
the mandatory nature of the Pennsylvania statute, the Pennsylvania capital punishment
sentencing system appears to share this constitutional flaw because the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has held that a defendant in a first degree murder case is always entitled to
request an instruction on lesser included offenses. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schauer, 493
Pa. 426, 426 A.2d 1090 (1981); Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 474 Pa. 27, 376 A.2d 247 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974).
86. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198. For a discussion of the role of appellate review, see infra
note 108.
87. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 194-95.
88. Id. at 198 (quoting Justice White's opinion in Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring)).
89. See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 3, at 26-29.
90. Comparable defendants, in the sense of defendants of equal culpability receiving
different sentences for murder, some the death penalty - most life imprisonment, seems to
me to be what the Justices in the majority in Furman meant by the arbitrary application of
the death penalty. See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text. Cf. Bowers and Pierce,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 563, 573 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bowers & Pierce]; Gillers, supra note 3, at 26-27.
It is not even clear that the scope of arbitrariness has been reduced. The requirement
that an aggravating factor be proved before the imposition of the death penalty is permitted
seems to reduce the number in the class of convicted murderers potentially subject to the
death penalty. But, in fact, aggravating factors may be so "broadly defined" that it is an
unusual murder case in which none are present. See Burden of Proof, supra note 3, at 316;
Gillers, supra note 3, at 28. Cf. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1982)
("[t]he defendant committed a killing while in perpetration of a felony"). Such a broad
definition may itself be unconstitutional. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) has been
interpreted by one court to require that aggravating circumstances identify murders or mur-
derers that stand "out above the norm." State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 63, 628 P.2d 943, 946
(1981).
91. The plurality approved executive discretion in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199. See Baldus,
Pulaski, Woodworth, and Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A
Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1, 85 (1980), [hereinafter cited as Excessive Sen-
tencing]; BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEvITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 67-68
(1974). See also State v. Harper, 208 Neb. 568, 576-77, 304 N.W.2d 663, 671-72 (1981)
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lier,92 the permissive sentencing language approved in Gregg per-
mits the sentencer to refuse to impose the death penalty for any
reason, or for no reason.9 3 Once aggravating circumstances are
found, the sentencer is free, as before, to settle upon wealth, re-
spectability, and race as reasons not to impose the death penalty.
In Furman, the individual sentenced to death could claim that
others, just as culpable, were not chosen for death. It was not dis-
puted that the petitioner in Gregg could make the same claim.s" If
the rich escape death, a person condemned may claim plausibly
that he is condemned because he is not rich.9
Justice Stewart responded in three ways to the argument that
the Georgia system did not alter the conditions that had produced
the arbitrary results condemned in Furman. As a general response
to the problem of discretion, Justice Stewart rejected the idea that
"Furman indirectly outlawed capital punishment by placing totally
unrealistic conditions on its use."9 Surprisingly, this argument ap-
pears to view Furman as a decision that justifies capital punish-
ment. Whether any capital sentencing system could satisfy
Furman's demand for non-arbitrariness was the issue that should
(Krivosha, C.J., dissenting in part). Abusive prosecutorial discretion can, of course, emerge
as an issue in a particular prosecution, even if, generally, such discretion is permitted. See
Messer v. State, 403 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1981); Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976).
92. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
93. While the jury in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) could be said to be lim-
ited to consideration of mitigating circumstances proved to outweigh aggravating circum-
stances, the jury recommendation is only advisory. See id. at 248-49. The trial judge deter-
mines the actual sentence. It is not clear whether the judge is free to impose a life sentence
for any reason or no reason. See id. at 250.
94. In fact, the petitioner in Gregg made a series of arguments that raised essentially
this issue. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199-207. The factual predicate of inconsistency was not
denied by Justice Stewart.
95. If aggravating circumstances are viewed as the reason that the death penalty is
imposed, the Georgia sentencing system looks rational, especially since, as Justice Stewart
said in Gregg, specified aggravating circumstances represent considerations deemed by soci-
ety to be "particularly relevant." Id. at 192. But the reason for the death penalty can just as
easily be viewed as the absence of some mitigating circumstances that a jury deems impor-
tant. (Since aggravating circumstances are so often present, viewing mitigating circum-
stances as the key to capital sentencing is a more sensible perspective. See supra note 90).
Since a mitigating circumstance can be whatever strikes the jury's fancy, the absence of
fame, wealth or respectability, or just a whim, can be the reason that death is imposed.
96. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50. One cannot simply assume that because our system of
criminal justice cannot redeem the Furman requirement of non-arbitrariness, the require-
ment itself is "unrealistic." It may be, instead, that the death penalty is incompatible with
our frailties.
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have been decided in Gregg.97 While Furman did not outlaw capi-
tal punishment, neither did it assure its continuation.'8
Justice Stewart also argued that the bifurcated system that was
a part of the Georgia sentencing scheme would improve capital
sentencing because the jury would receive information for the sen-
tencing decision that would have been excluded under the usual
one-trial sentencing systems in use at the time Furman had been
decided. 9" There is no doubt that bifurcated trials represent an im-
provement in capital sentencing; however, since information con-
cerning aggravating circumstances usually is admissible at the guilt
phase of the trial,100 the additional information will normally con-
cern mitigating factors. Increases in mitigating information do not
lessen arbitrariness. In fact, bifurcated procedures giving a sen-
tencer more reasons to spare people, undermine the coherence of
the concept of arbitrariness as understood in Furman. 1 When
97. Cf. Black, Due Process For Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26
CAm. U.L. REv. 1, 12 (1976): "[D]eath is unique, and the procedure we must use, having no
better, in our system of justice ... may still not be good enough for the death choice."
98. There seemed to be a majority in Furman for the proposition that the death pen-
alty is not per se unconstitutional. See New Statutes, supra note 5, at 1691 n.5. While
Justices Stewart and White stated that the issue need not be reached, they did appear to
reach it after all. Furman, 408 U.S. at 306, 308 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-12
(White, J., concurring). Nevertheless, neither Justice was obligated to find in future cases
that new death penalty statutes resolved the criticisms made in Furman. Cf. supra notes 70-
74 and accompanying text. Justice White, for one, suggested capital punishment had "run
its course." Furman, 408 U.S. at 313. Furman's criticisms of the application of the death
penalty certainly could have turned out to be both valid and unavoidable.
99. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92.
100. Of the 10 aggravating circumstances in the Pennsylvania statute, for example,
eight involve aspects of the crime that would almost always be admissible to prove guilt. 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(1)-(8) (Purdon Supp. 1982). The remaining two aggravating
circumstances concern the criminal record of the defendant. Id. § 9711(d)(9), (10). Whether
the defendant's criminal record would be admissible in the guilt phase of a murder case
depends on a particular state's rule of allowable impeachment and whether the defendant
testifies at the guilt phase.
101. The idea of arbitrariness in Furman assumed that defendants in different cases
could be considered in some sense comparable. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
Such a concept seems attractive from the point of view of aggravating circumstances, which
are often objective in nature. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198. Cf. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §
9711(d)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1982) (victim a fireman or certain types of other government offi-
cial); id. § 9711(d)(2) (contract killing); id. § 9711(d)(3) (victim held hostage); id. §
9711(d)(4) (murder during hijacking); id. § 9711(d)(5) (victim a prosecution witness); id. §
9711(d)(6) (murder during a felony); id. § 9711(d)(7) (gave risk of death to another); id. §
9711(d)(8) (murder by torture); id. § 9711(d)(10) (murder by one previously convicted of
capital offense); but see id. § 9711(d)(9) ("significant history" of violent felony convictions);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422 (1980) (aggravating circumstance that the murder
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more mitigating information is presented, it becomes more difficult
to identify similar cases for similar treatment.102
Justice Stewart's specific response to the problem of absolute
sentencer discretion in Gregg was to emphasize appellate review of
sentences and the nature of mercy. Justice Stewart did not dispute
that juries could return a life sentence for any reason, or no reason,
but referred to such an event as an "isolated decision,"' 0 which
was subject to the Georgia Supreme Court's proportionality re-
view' 4 and which did not invalidate the sentencing system.1
0 5
Justice Stewart's view seems to have been that if juries generally
reject death in a certain class of cases, the Georgia Supreme Court
will see that death is never imposed in cases of that class. 06 Thus,
death will not be imposed arbitrarily. On the other hand, if a jury
spares someone merely on a whim, an occasional act of grace does
not undermine the sentencing system as a whole. Such a decision
represents a benefit to the individual defendant, but is not a bur-
den on other defendants. As one article has described this ap-
proach, there must be a reason for imposing the death penalty, but
there need not be one for not imposing it upon someone who de-
serves it.'
0 7
"was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, deprav-
ity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim"). Once the focus shifts from aggravating
circumstances to mitigating circumstances, the differences among defendants undermines
the easy assurance of the Furman opinions that certain capital cases are alike. Cf. Gillers,
supra note 3, at 29-30.
102. The presentation of detailed, individualized mitigating evidence not only renders
problematic the concept of non-arbitrary jury sentencing over time, as a practical matter it
undermines the appellate role of ensuring the sentencing consistency that the Gregg plural-
ity considered vital. See supra note 86. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. Cf.
Combs, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Judi-
cial Control, 7 S. UNIv. L. Rav. 1, 34 (1980); 1977 Term, supra note 56; New Statutes, supra
note 5, at 1703-04. New methods of review may be necessary to overcome this problem as-
suming that it can be overcome. See Excessive Sentencing, supra note 91.
103. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203.
104. The Georgia Supreme Court was to review every death sentence to determine,
inter alia, "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Id. at 204 (citation
omitted).
105. Id. at 203-06. Justice Stewart is not entirely clear on the relationship among sen-
tencing elements. He appears to assume that generally the aggravating circumstance ap-
proach, which guides jury discretion, will ensure non-arbitrariness. Id. at 197. Appellate pro-
portionality review represents an "additional safeguard," id., at 198, against an "aberrant
jury." Id. at 206.
106. Id. at 206.
107. See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 31, at 376: "[T]he eighth amendment requires
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Aside from its ungrounded faith in appellate review, one of Jus-
tice Stewart's arguments represents a very narrow interpretation of
Furman.10 8 In Gregg it appears that the arbitrariness problem in
Furman had not been that some who deserved death received
death while others who also deserved death did not. Gregg suggests
that the only problem with the death penalty had been that almost
everyone who deserved death did not receive it, except for a hand-
ful selected at random. 0 9 Thus, the fact that after Gregg, Georgia
juries will return life sentences for some persons who deserve to die
does not invalidate the statute, because such acts will not occur
most of the time. 10
reliability and guided discretion in the decision to impose death, but not in the decision to
afford mercy by imposing a non-capital sentence." Id.
108. There are three senses in which the plurality's reliance upon appellate propor-
tionality review is misguided. In the first place, the task itself, ensuring that like defendants
are treated alike, may be an incoherent task. See supra note 102. Second, the plurality
failed to clarify the relationship of jury grace to arbitrariness. If occasionally juries spare a
certain kind of defendant, those decisions represent isolated decisions to grant mercy and
the state supreme court is not expected to intervene on behalf of defendants not spared. On
the other hand, if certain types of defendants are "generally" spared, the state supreme
court is obligated to reverse death sentences for those not spared. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206. At
what point the ratio of life sentences to death sentences tips, is unclear. See Excessive Sen-
tencing, supra note 91, at 16 n.52.
But by far the most serious criticism of the plurality's reliance upon state appellate
courts to protect defendants from arbitrary sentencing is that the state courts had to under-
stand an appellate role that went beyond ensuring that substantial evidence justified the
death penalty in a given case. There is reason to believe that not all state courts have under-
stood their apparently constitutionally critical role. See Hargrave v. State, 366 So. 2d 1, 5
(Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 985 (1979) (to be overturned, a death penalty must re-
present a departure, or the defendant must not deserve death); Williams v. Maggio, 679
F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (reviewing court held that it would not pass on the ade-
quacy of all aggravating circumstances found, but only one). Cf. Quince v. State, 51
U.S.L.W. 3251 (Oct. 4, 1982) (No. 82-5096) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari
in Quince v. State, 414 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1982)); Confrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429-33
(1980). See generally, Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L.J.
97 (1979).
109. In the language of Justice Stewart's image in Furman, the problem with being
struck by lightning is not that the person struck does not deserve it anymore than the per-
sons not struck. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309. Rather, the complaint is that, of the group who
deserve it, almost no one is struck by lightning. The answer to this criticism simply is to
increase the number struck by lightning, which is what Justice Stewart apparently sought to
do in Gregg.
110. This re-interpretation of Furman would not be acceptable even if it turned out to
be true that most people who deserve to die receive the death penalty. Justice Stewart's
approach simply ignores the question put by the one condemned, "why am I condemned
when he is not?" No matter how few are spared, this question represents a serious moral
issue. See Super Due Process, supra note 56, at 1150. In any event, the facts appear to show
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Justice Stewart's approach to jury grace rests upon curious em-
pirical assumptions. Because of the requirement of at least one ag-
gravating circumstance, the pool of those eligible for death may be
smaller than previously." 1 Justice Stewart apparently assumed in
Gregg that under the new Georgia sentencing system sentencers
would hand out a much higher proportion of death penalties to
members of this smaller pool, than under the pre-Furman sys-
tem."'2 Whether this has turned out to be the case is not yet
known,"13 but looking at the sentencing system as a whole, it surely
remained true after Gregg that most murderers who qualify for
death because at least one aggravating circumstance is present," 4
will not receive a death sentence."
5
From the perspective of the sentencing decision itself, the essen-
tially unlimited discretion given to Georgia sentencers not to im-
pose death did invite, if it did not assure, the same random pattern
of like cases treated differently that was condemned in Furman.
Indeed, the underlying inconsistency between Gregg and Furman
has now become clearer as state court opinions have criticized un-
guided mitigating discretion as inconsistent with attempts to limit
that many are spared, just as before. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
111. This is uncertain. See supra note 90. Cf. Kanter, Brief Against Death: More On
the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment in Oregon, 17 WILANMErE L. REv. 629, 636
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Kanter].
112. There is very little empirical evidence concerning the arbitrariness of the imposi-
tion of the death penalty prior to Furman. See Note, Discrimination and Aribtrariness in
Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Post-Furman Cases in Dade County Florida, 1973-
1976, 133 STAN. L. Rav. 75, 84-85 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dade County]. The majority
assumed arbitrariness from the extreme infrequency of imposition. See, e.g., Furman, 408
U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313
(White, J., concurring). Infrequency was certainly demonstrable. Dade County, supra.
113. Cf. Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida
Experience, 95 HAuiv. L. Rzv. 456, 458-59 (1981) (racial discrimination by race of victim
prevalent in 1977 in Florida); Excessive Sentencing, supra note 91, at 21 (impossible to say
yet whether comparatively excessive sentencing is occurring under post-Gregg statutes);
Dix, Administration of the Texas Death Penalty Statutes: Constitutional Infirmities Re-
lated to Predictions of Dangerousness, 55 Tx. L. REv. 1343, 1403-07 (1977) (evidence of
inconsistent sentencing patterns in Texas). See also Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposi-
tion of the Death Penalty: A Comparison of the Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced
Pre-Furman and Post-Furman, 49 TaMp. L.Q. 261 (1976).
114. That is a substantial proportion of those who murder. See supra note 90.
115. See Dade County, supra note 112 (of 54 first degree murder convictions involving
death during the commission of a felony, where the death penalty was an available option,
ten death penalties were imposed and sustained; the author considers 24 of the life sentence




arbitrariness in capital sentencing."'
Despite the inconsistency in approach between Furman's em-
phasis on the elimination of arbitrariness and Gregg's allowance of
unlimited discretion to refuse to return the death penalty, one
could not say that Furman was repudiated in Gregg. Justice Stew-
art's opinion downplayed arbitrariness because it emphasized an-
other value, reliability in capital sentencing, that had not been at
issue in Furman."7 In rejecting an automatic death penalty in
Woodson v. North Carolina, Justice Stewart stated that full con-
sideration of mitigating circumstances is necessary to achieve a
"just and appropriate sentence."' 18 In Gregg, Justice Stewart re-
ferred to Woodson in rejecting the argument that too much discre-
tion remained in the Georgia sentencing system." 9 No matter what
a defendant has done, a death sentence might be unjust in light of
the defendant's personal qualities. Permissive sentencing is a way
to ensure reliability-to ensure that persons who do not deserve
the death penalty, do not receive it. 20 The difficulty is that the
discretion that is seen as necessary to promote reliability, may in-
crease arbitrariness.' 2 ' While Lockett v. Ohio'22 is generally viewed
as exacerbating this problem,'23 in fact, Lockett and mandatory
116. See Peek v. State, 395 So. 2d 492, 497 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964
(1981); State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 25, 292 S.E.2d 203, 227 (1982); cf. Commonwealth v.
Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 251-52, 382 A.2d 442, 456-57 (1977) (Nix, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 914 (1978); 44 Mo. L. REV. 359, 365 (1979); Note, The Prosecutor's Discretionary
Power to Initiate The Death Sentencing Hearing - People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 29
DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1980).
117. By reliability, I mean an assurance that the defendant who receives the death
penalty in fact deserves to die. By putting the matter this starkly, I do not mean to imply
that arbitrariness and reliability are unrelated. In deciding whether someone "deserves" the
death penalty, the fact that others just like him do not receive the death penalty is obvi-
ously significant. See Super Due Process, supra note 56, at 1150-51.
118. 428 U.S. at 304.
119. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199-200 n.50.
120. See Hertz and Weisberg, supra note 31, at 322; Mandatory Death Penalty, supra
note 82, at 651-52.
121. See Kanter, supra note 111, at 637-38.
122. 428 U.S. 586 (1978). See infra notes 125-53 and accompanying text.
123. Lockett's requirement of the admission of broad categories of mitigating evidence
in the sentencing hearing brought forth a multitude of observations that the Court was
undermining the Furman requirement of non-arbitrariness. See infra notes 135-39 and ac-
companying text. See, e.g., 44 Mo. L. REV. 359 (1979) (Lockett is "[a]nother retreat from
Furman v. Georgia"); 16 AM. CaIM. L. REV. 317 (1979) (Lockett is an "[albout face"); Bur-
den of Proof, supra note 3, at 351-52 (Supreme Court "shifted gears" in Lockett). See also
State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tenn. 1981) (Block, J., dissenting) (tension between
Furman and Lockett). The dissenters in Lockett were particularly critical on this point. See
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 21:103
sentencing statutes may be interpreted as an attempt to resolve
the conflict between eliminating arbitrariness and ensuring
reliability.
C. Lockett v. Ohio and Mandatory Sentencing Statutes:
Eliminating the Irrelevant
1. Reliability
Lockett v. Ohio and its companion case, Bell v. Ohio124 over-
turned the Ohio death penalty statute which permitted the intro-
duction of broad categories of defense evidence at the sentencing
hearing, 125 but limited the sentencer's 2 6 authority to evaluate it.
This evidence could only be relied upon in establishing three miti-
gating circumstances: "(1) The victim of the offense induced or fa-
cilitated it; (2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been com-
mitted, but for the fact that the offender was under duress,
coercion, or strong provocation; (3) The offense was primarily the
product of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though
such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of in-
sanity. 1 17 The fact that Sandra Lockett did not intend the death
of the victim and her relatively minor role in the killing12 8 could
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 622 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The Court has
now completed its about face since Furman v. Georgia. ... ); id. at 629 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court has gone from pillar to post . .
124. 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
125. The defendant was permitted to introduce evidence concerning "the nature and
circumstances of the offense" and the "history, character and condition" of the defendant.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 593. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (1975).
126. The Ohio statute provided for capital sentencing by the trial judge if the defen-
dant had been tried by a jury. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 593; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
2929.03(C)(2) (1975). Sandra Lockett's sentencing hearing was conducted by the trial judge.
See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 593.-
127. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 593-94. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(1)-(3).
128. Sandra Lockett was charged with aggravated murder, with two aggravating speci-
fications: "(1) that the murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detention, appre-
hension, trial or punishment for aggravated robbery, and (2) that the murder was commit-
ted while . . . committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing
or attempting to commit . . . aggravated robbery." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589.
Testimony at the trial established that Lockett agreed with two others to commit an
armed robbery at a pawn shop. The defendant's role was to keep watch outside the shop
and drive the getaway car. The conspirators had not planned to kill anyone. The shop owner
was killed during the holdup when he grabbed for a gun used by one of the conspirators.
Lockett's attorney maintained at trial that the defendant did not know of the robbery plan.
Id. at 589-93.
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not be considered as mitigation, except to the extent that this in-
formation tended to establish one of the three statutory mitigating
circumstances.' 29 This limitation upon the consideration of defense
evidence was enforced by the mandatory nature of the Ohio stat-
ute. '3 Once one aggravating circumstance was proved, death was
required unless one of the three mitigating circumstances was
established.
Chief Justice Burger wrote the lead opinion on behalf of himself
and the Gregg plurality.1 31 Chief Justice Burger followed the analy-
sis of Woodson v. North Carolina,5 Roberts v. Louisiana,5 5 and
H. Roberts v. Louisiana,34 on the theory that though the Ohio
statute permitted some consideration of mitigation, the narrow
categories of mitigation the statute recognized created "the risk
that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty"135 just as did automatic death
penalty statutes. 3  The dominant consideration for Chief Justice
129. There were other possible mitigating circumstances upon which the statute did
not permit the trial judge to base a sentence of life imprisonment. Lockett was 21 years old,
of average or below average intelligence, indicated a favorable prognosis for rehabilitation,
and had no record of major offenses although she had been convicted of several minor ones.
Id. at 594. The trial judge stated that he had "no alternative" but to impose the death
penalty. Id.
130. If the Ohio statute had been a permissive statute, that is if the sentencer had
been instructed that if none of the three mitigating circumstances were established, the
death penalty could be imposed, the sentencer would have been free to impose a life sen-
tence based on non-specified mitigating circumstances. The problem identified by Chief Jus-
tice Burger arose precisely because the Ohio statute was a mandatory statute that required
death unless one of the three mitigating circumstances was proved.
131. Although Chief Justice Burger's views concerning the constitutional requirements
for mitigating evidence in death penalty sentencing hearings literally reflected only four
votes, Justice Marshall's concurrence seemed to agree with the plurality's analysis. See
Lockett, 438 U.S. at at 620-21 (Marshall, J., concurring). Thus, one may regard the Chief
Justice's opinion in Lockett as a majority position. Justice Brennan, who did not participate
in the case, might have agreed as well. There is no certainty about Justice Blackmun's
views. See Hertz and Weisberg, supra note 31, at 325 n.43.
132. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
133. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
134. 431 U.S. 633 (1977). In H. Roberts, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion
joined by Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens held that an automatic death
penalty for killing a police officer violates the eighth amendment. The per curiam opinion
relied heavily on Woodson and Roberts. Id. at 635-38.
135. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
136. In Lbckett, Chief Justice Burger did leave open the possibility that a statute that
mandates death for a very narrow class of crimes, such as murder by a life-term prisoner,
might be constitutional. Id. at 604 n.11. See Mandatory Death Penalty, supra note 82.
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Burger in Lockett was reliability. 137 This concept, which Chief Jus-
tice Burger traced to Woodson,' required procedures that at-
tempt to ensure that "death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case." 9 Ohio had run the risk of the "wrong" decision not
by keeping out evidence, but by instructing the sentencer not to
give the mitigating evidence full consideration.
2. Relevance
The concept of relevance is another aspect of Lockett which has
received much attention from state courts considering the admissi-
bility of proferred mitigating evidence.14 0 In Woodson, Justice
Stewart held that the eighth amendment "required consideration
of the character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense.114' In Lockett, Chief Justice
Burger reiterated this formulation, and added that this eighth
amendment requirement included "any aspect" of character, re-
cord, or offense. " 2 The sentencer must also be permitted to give
137. The relationship between reliability and individualization in sentencing is clear in
Lockett: individualized sentencing, that is sentencing procedures that allow very broad miti-
gating evidence in order to concentrate attention on this defendant and this offense, helps
to ensure reliability in sentencing. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602 ("the definition of crimes
generally has not been thought automatically to dictate what should be the proper
penalty").
The relationship between reliability and the value of "respect for the uniqueness of the
individual" is not so clear. Certainly Chief Justice Burger expressed the idea that because
death is different from any other sentence, "respect for humanity" requires a greater degree
of reliability in death penalty sentencing than in other kinds of sentencing. Id. at 604 (quot-
ing Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304). Thus, respect for persons requires reliability which in turn
requires individualization (i.e., broad mitigation) in death penalty sentencing hearings.
But a quite different approach would require individualization in sentencing without
reference to reliability. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman suggested that the eighth
amendment prevents punishments that treat people "as objects." Furman, 408 U.S. at 273.
It might well be argued that respect for persons requires consideration of each person's
uniqueness regardless of the consequences of such a procedure for sentencing outcomes. It
seems clear that Chief Justice Burger did not base his conclusion that broad mitigation
must be admitted into evidence on this ground, but rather because of the predicted conse-
quence of such a requirement: more reliable capital sentencing.
138. 438 U.S. at 601 (Woodson required consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense "in order to ensure
. ..reliability").
139. 438 U.S. at 601 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305).
140. See infra note 147.
141. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
142. 438 U.S. at 604. "[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from
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such mitigating evidence full consideration.14 Such evidence he
defined as "relevant."" 4 But in a footnote, Chief Justice Burger
stated that information relating to character, record, and offense
was the only type of mitigating evidence accorded constitutional
protection. "Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional author-
ity of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the
defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his of-
fense.' ' 4 5 Other evidence could be excluded and, presumably if
somehow admitted, could be precluded from consideration. " 6
Thus, according to the Lockett opinion, there are two kinds of mit-
igating evidence. Reasons relating to character, record, and offense
are relevant. Reasons that do not refer to character, record, and
offense are irrelevant. Irrelevant evidence is excludable. In Lockett,
Chief Justice Burger created an admissibility formula.1
4
1
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense ...." Id. (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
143. Id. at 605. "[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to
circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty" and is thus
unconstitutional. Id.
144. Id. at 604.
145. Id. at 604 n.12.
146. Of course this recognition does not mean that states are obligated to exclude such
irrelevant evidence-that is, evidence relating to factors other than character, record and
offense. See, e.g., Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981) (evidence of effect of
defendant's execution on family and society admissible whether within Lockett definition of
relevant evidence, or not). But see People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 266 (1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3217 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982) (No. 1893) (instruction
that governor may commute sentence of life imprisonment without parole violates due pro-
cess by introduction of matters deemed irrelevant in Lockett). Ramos probably does not
stand for the proposition that mitigating evidence proffered by a defendant that is outside
the character-record-offense formulation must be excluded. The California Supreme Court
was obviously greatly influenced by its alternative holding that the instruction was incom-
plete and misleading and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 578-81, 639 P.2d at 933-36, 180 Cal.
Rptr. at 291-94. In terms of death penalty precedent, the evil in the instruction is not that it
introduces factors irrelevant under Lockett, but that it suggests a reason for death, incapaci-
tation, that the United States Supreme Court has never accepted as a legitimate ground for
the death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 152, 183-87 (1976) (although mentioning
incapacitation as a proffered justification for the death penalty, only general deterrence and
retribution were relied upon). Specific deterrence thus becomes a kind of non-statutory,
unclearly-labelled aggravating circumstance, in violation of Furman's non-arbitrariness
principle. See Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1981); Proffitt v. Wainwright,
685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982). See also supra note 22.
147. See, e.g., Burrows v. State, 640 P.2d 533 (Okla. 1982) (mitigating evidence is ad-
missible to the extent it bears on the defendant's character, record or the circumstances of
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What does "relevant" mean in this context? Generally speaking,
evidence is deemed relevant when it has probative value, that is, it
tends to prove a proposition in dispute. 48 The issue in dispute in a
death penalty hearing, in Chief Justice Burger's view, is whether
"death is the appropriate punishment," or, to put the matter in its
most dramatic form, whether the defendant deserves to die.149 Mit-
igating evidence outside the formula is irrelevant because it does
not tend to prove that the defendant does not deserve to die.
The idea that some reasons upon which a jury might decide to
spare a defendant are not relevant to whether the defendant de-
serves to die, establishes a link between Lockett and the non-arbi-
trariness principle of Furman. In deciding upon a life sentence a
jury might conduct a lottery, or act on whim, or consider the
wealth and power of a defendant's family. All of these considera-
tions could be "reasons" for returning a life sentence, but I have no
doubt Chief Justice Burger would consider them to be "irrelevant"
considerations-that is, they do not bear on the issue of what pun-
ishment the defendant deserves. This of course assumes a theory
that accounts for what should be considered and what should not
be considered in the decision to impose capital punishment-an
issue which is addressed below.150 It also assumes that the Lockett
formula encompasses the proper considerations-a matter subject
to question."' Nevertheless, by use of the concept of relevance,
the offense); State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1982) (Lockett factors define what
information is relevant to issue of punishment); State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 101, 282 S.E.2d
439, 447 (1981) (co-defendant's plea bargain excluded from consideration at sentencing
hearing-such evidence does not relate to character, record or offense as defined in Lockett);
State v. Cherry, 248 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979) (evidence not shedding light on the
defendant's character, record or the circumstances of the offense, the matter at issue, is
irrelevant and hence inadmissible).
148. See McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, §§ 184-85 (E. Cleary 2d
ed. 1972). To be precise evidence is relevant when it has probative value and is material
when the matter the evidence tends to prove is in dispute. I have collapsed the evidentiary
terminology, but, I think, without harm to the basic distinctions. See also 1 J. WIGMOIE, A
TREATISE OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 12
(1940).
149. The use of the term "deserves" to die is not meant to suggest that some theory of
retribution is the only ground upon which a decision for life or death could be justified.
Other values, specifically general deterrence and incapacitation, have been mentioned as
grounds for imposition of the death penalty, and I do not mean to exclude them as relevant
to aggravating circumstances, nor their absence as a relevant mitigating circumstance. See
supra note 146.
150. See infra pt. III, sec. B.
151. See infra pt. III, sec. A.
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Chief Justice Burger is echoing Justice White's requirement of a
"meaningful basis" for the decision. 15 2 The decision to impose
death, or its reverse, to grant life, will not be arbitrary if it is based
on considerations deemed relevant. 15
3. Relevance and Reliability In Permissive and Mandatory
Statutes
From the perspective of deciding on a capital sentence by ref-
erence only to relevant evidence, the statutory sentencing system
approved in Gregg appears to be seriously flawed and the Pennsyl-
vania mandatory system a significant improvement. In Gregg, the
jury is instructed to consider all mitigating circumstances and de-
cide upon the sentence.'" Justice Stewart in Gregg referred to this
permissive sentencing aspect of .the statute " as "the decision of a
jury to afford mercy."15 But from the relevance perspective, mercy
could be based upon irrelevant considerations as well as relevant
ones. Gregg permits the sentencer to give a life sentence even if
relevant considerations are not persuasive.15 7 The sentencer is free
to consider irrelevant matters such as class, race, respectability,
the roll of the dice, or anything else. The Georgia courts might
deny that the sentencer is free to consider such matters. The
courts might exclude such evidence, and not permit argument
based on such factors.'58 Nevertheless, the sentencer is never told
152. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
153. See Gillers, supra note 3, at 30:
A relevant mitigating factor ... enables a sentencer to decide against the death pen-
alty for one of two defendants, possibly even if it is only difference between them. A
factor is relevant if it represents a rational consideration in choices of penalty. Conse-
quently, a decision based, in whole or in part, on a relevant factor is by definition not
arbitrary.
Id.
154. 428 U.S. at 164. The jury is told to consider aggravating circumstances as well. Id.
155. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
156. 428 U.S. at 203.
157. Cf. Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 830, 842 (1980) (mitigating evidence
admissible in Georgia whether admissible under Lockett or not).
158. Cf. State v. Collier, 244 Ga. 553, 568, 261 S.E.2d 364, 376 (1979) (no error to
exclude some types of character evidence because of "danger of ... irrelevant testimony
inherent in character evidence ...."); State v. Franklin, 245 Ga. 141, 148, 263 S.E.2d 666,
673 (1980) (testimony at sentencing hearing concerning conditions on death row and reli-
gious and philosophical positions on the death penalty, should be addressed to legislature;
such evidence may be excluded from sentencing hearing).
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to restrict consideration to relevant matters."l 9
Lockett suggests, though it does not require, 60 a very different
approach to sentencing. Because of concern for reliability, the sen-
tencer must be given full discretion to return a life sentence. But
in order to limit arbitrary results, the sentencer may be ordered to
consider only evidence that is relevant. Chief Justice Burger did
not believe he was sacrificing reliability by limiting consideration
to relevant matters.161 He assumed that he could identify the fac-
tors that ought to be considered in capital sentencing.'62 If relevant
factors were considered, the resulting sentence would be reliable.
163
The Pennsylvania death penalty statute creates just such a sen-
tencing system through its mandatory language. The statute seeks
to ensure reliability by requiring the fullest possible consideration
of relevant mitigating evidence. The statute reduces the likelihood
of consideration of irrelevant factors by instructing the sentencer
to consider relevant mitigating evidence only, that is, any evidence
"concerning the character and record of the defendant and the cir-
cumstances of his offense. 1 64 If no relevant mitigating evidence is
present, or if such evidence is outweighed by evidence of aggravat-
ing circumstances, the death penalty must be imposed.1 65 Consid-
159. The sentencer may give life for any, or no reason. See supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
160. That is, irrelevant evidence may still be heard. See supra note 146.
161. In fact, reliability was the chief value identified in Chief Justice Burger's plural-
ity opinion. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
162. For me this conclusion is inescapable considering the Chief Justice's ease in pro-
claiming character, record, and offense as the only relevant considerations for a capital sen-
tencer. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-06; id. at 604 n.12. In defense of Chief Justice Burger,
he apparently felt he was merely expanding on a relevance definition contained in Woodson.
See id. at 604 (from "relevant facets" of the defendant's character and record or the circum-
stances of the offense in Woodson, to "any aspect" of same).
163. If the character-record offense formula were sufficiently broad to encompass all
relevant considerations, a mandatory sentencing system would come close to the goal of
reliability. See infra note 167. It is possible that the sentencer might refuse to consider the
relevant mitigating evidence proffered, but such an event would not represent a criticism of
the relevance limitation on mitigating evidence. This relevancy approach, however, cannot
be sufficiently broad. See infra pt. III.
164. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1982). Mitigating circum-
stance number (8) is a catch-all designed to permit all constitutionally required mitigating
evidence to be admitted and considered. Cf. Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 382
A.2d 442 (1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978). The other seven mitigating circumstances
would all fit easily within the confines of number (8). Accordingly, it is number (8) which
defines admissible mitigating evidence in Pennsylvania.
165. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (Purdon Supp. 1982).
134.
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eration of irrelevant factors that, in the language of Furman, lead
to arbitrary results,'" are precluded.
Permissive sentencing statutes may plausibly be said to provide
a greater degree of reliability than do mandatory statutes. The sen-
tencer in a permissive system is free to consider and to impose a
life sentence based upon any kind of consideration.' 67 Neverthe-
less, as argued above, this assurance of reliability is accomplished
at the sacrifice of the value of non-arbitrariness that was so central
in Furman."' Mandatory statutes promise a greater degree of non-
arbitrariness by seeking to limit the sentencer's consideration to
relevant mitigating factors, while not sacrificing reliability because
those relevant factors will be given full and complete
consideration.'e"
This account of how the mandatory language in the Pennsylva-
nia statute can be understood 170 contains serious, in fact fatal, con-
166. That is, different results that do not coincide with differences among defendants
in deserving the death penalty. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
167. Even though Chief Justice Burger attempted in Lockett to include all relevant
factors in his admissibility formula, he would no doubt admit that any limitation on admis-
sibility poses some risk that the death penalty will be imposed despite "factors which may
call for a less severe penalty." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605; see supra notes 154-63 and accom-
panying text. A permissive system that admits any possibly mitigating factors into evidence
and permits them to be considered presents less of a risk, and hence is more reliable.
Ironically, states that have permissive death penalty statutes often still limit the admis-
sibility of mitigating evidence to the confines of the Lockett formula. See, e.g., Franklin v.
State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d 666 (1980). Cf. Christopher v. State, 407 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla.
1981); Perry v. State, 395 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1980). In such an instance, the state is in the
peculiar position of permitting the sentencer to make decisions based on considerations
deemed irrelevant, but not permitting such considerations to be raised formally.
168. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
169. Thus, the major objection to Lockett, that it undermined Furman, mistook the
sentencing structure that Chief Justice Burger was trying to create. See supra note 123 and
accompanying text. Whether successful or not, Chief Justice Burger was not knowingly giv-
ing up the "concern with capriciousness" since those spared would be so for relevant rea-
sons. See The 1977 Term, supra note 56, at 106-07. See also Recent Developments, supra
note 113, at 331 (Lockett sacrificed consistency for individualization). Although Justice
Rehnquist criticize requiring the states to permit "anything under the sun" as mitigation,
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 631, the Chief Justice's opinion demonstrates that this was not done in
Lockett. Id. at 604 n.12. Justice White voiced the same objection. Id. at 622 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Contrary to their expectations, Lockett has
proved to represent both an expansion of mitigation, and a limitation. See supra note 147.
170. It is not clear how much, if any of this suggested justification for mandatory sen-
tencing was in the minds of those who passed the present sentencing statute. The 1974
statute was a mandatory statute, but it is not clear why in 1978 the mandatory sentencing
format was retained. See supra note 50. I am proposing a way of understanding what the
legislature did, if not necessarily what they thought.
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stitutional weaknesses. Mandatory statutes fail to fulfill the prom-
ise of a more coherent capital sentencing system for reasons both
small and great. Part III will analyze some of these reasons, mov-
ing from the relatively minor, and hence possibly correctable, to
the more significant-those that cast doubt upon the enterprise of
justification of the death penalty begun in Furman and continued
in Lockett.
III. INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION OF "FACTORS WHICH MAY CALL
FOR A LESS SEVERE PENALTY" 17
As Gregg's approval of permissive sentencing shows, the Su-
preme Court has chosen consistently to place more emphasis upon
protecting those who do not deserve to die, than upon ensuring
that the equally reprehensible are treated equally. And though
Chief Justice Burger sought to achieve both goals in Lockett,1 72 the
entire structure of that opinion demonstrates that its starting
point and major ground is reliability - the assurance that death is
the appropriate punishment.17 Lockett's first promise is that a de-
fendant is entitled to every legitimate argument to convince the
sentencer to return a life sentence. The character-record-offense
formula is just a way of defining which considerations are relevant.
But the formula fails to guarantee consideration of all factors
which may call for a less severe penalty. In the first place, the
character-record-offense formula is too restrictive. In the second
place, the Court has refused to create any standard by which to
judge the relevance of proffered mitigating evidence and argument.
Finally, the insistence upon a reason for mitigation is not a justifia-
ble limitation upon sentencer discretion to return a life sentence.
Because the concept of relevant mitigating circumstances is so
flawed, requiring death unless relevant mitigating circumstances
are found - the essence of the Pennsylvania mandatory scheme -
fails to satisfy the Supreme Court's insistence upon a reliable
death penalty sentencing system.
171. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
172. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
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A. Challenges to the Death Penalty and to Aggravating
Circumstances
In order to demonstrate that the character-record-offense
formula is too restrictive, and thus in a mandatory context that it
creates a substantial risk of unreliable capital sentencing, one must
show that a piece of proffered evidence or a line of proposed argu-
ment that is outside the formula is a proper ground upon which to
reject the death penalty in a given case. Such a showing would in-
validate the Lockett admissibility formula because the concept of
relevance by its nature does not exclude appropriate evidence and
because Lockett's fundamental requirement that all factors calling
for a less severe penalty be considered does not permit such
exclusion.
In a series of cases, state courts have been called upon to decide
whether defendants are permitted to introduce evidence at a sen-
tencing hearing that attacks the general acceptability of capital
punishment.1 7 A general challenge could also be made with re-
spect to certain aggravating circumstances. Defense counsel could
argue, for example, that even if present, certain aggravating cir-
cumstances are not sufficiently important to warrant death.17 5
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to rule upon either
issue, it is difficult to see how such evidence could be admitted
under the mandatory structure of the Pennsylvania statute. 
1 7
174. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 628 S.W.2d 284 (Ark. 1982) (evidence of moral and philo-
sophical foundations of death penalty excluded); State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn.
1982) (validity of deterrence excluded); State v. Plath, 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981)
(evidence of process of electrocution excluded); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d
666 (1980) (description of execution excluded); Shriner v. State, 386 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1980)
(description of execution excluded); State v. Cherry, 248 N.C. 86, 257 N.E.2d 551 (1979)
(evidence of religious objections and execution of innocent persons excluded); Irving v.
State, 361 So. 2d 1360 (Miss. 1978) (evidence of discrimination excluded); Cf. State v.
Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977) (no criticism of evidence concerning propriety of death
penalty).
175. See Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1979); cf. Granviel v. Estelle, 655
F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981). The North Carolina death penalty statute, for example, raises the
issue of sufficiency directly. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15 A-2000(b)(1) (Supp. 1981) (the sen-
tencer is to decide whether "any sufficient aggravating circumstances . . . exist").
176. Refusing the defendant the right to admit such evidence, or to make such argu-
ments has been the general trend in both mandatory and permissive states. See supra note
174. Cf. supra notes 6-7. Such evidence is arguably outside the relevance limits in Lockett.
How courts in jurisdictions with permissive statutes justify such limitations on admissi-
bility is difficult to understand. Cf. supra note 167. For example, in Mississippi, the sentenc-
ing jury is called upon to decide whether aggravating circumstances are "sufficient" and
1982
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The Pennsylvania statute defines admissible mitigating circum-
stances along the lines of the Lockett character-record-offense
formula.1 77 Thus the issue of admissibility of such evidence and
argument would be, in formal terms, whether attacks on the death
penalty or specific aggravating circumstances, concern a defen-
dant's character, record, or the nature of the offense. Courts have
generally answered this question in the negative, and excluded
such evidence and argument.7  An argument could be made that
even in terms of Lockett these decisions are wrong because
whether this defendant's character, record, and offense are such
that he deserves to die,179 cannot be decided without reference to
the larger issue of whether anyone deserves to die. Nevertheless,
the character-record-offense approach is not phrased in a way that
justifies the admission of such evidence."'
There are two bases upon which to conclude that despite their
exclusion by the Lockett formula, attacks upon the death penalty
and upon particular aggravating circumstances are proper consid-
erations for a sentencer in a capital case. The first such source is
the methodology the Supreme Court has used to evaluate eighth
amendment challenges to the death penalty.
In assessing whether the death penalty was constitutional for
whether the defendant "should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death." See Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2) (1972). The jury is directed in an indirect way to aggravating and
mitigating circumstances ("[b]ased on these considerations .... "), but a statutory limit on
the jury's sentencing authority is difficult to reconcile with the sentencer's obligation to
judge sufficiency. Nevertheless, the Mississippi Supreme Court held recently that attacks
"on the propriety of the death penalty" are not a permissible subject of argument at the
sentencing hearing. Johnson v. State, 416 So. 2d 383, 392 (Miss. 1982). It would seem clear
that a jury convinced that the death penalty is morally wrong, or that it does not deter
murder, could find honestly that existing aggravating circumstances are not "sufficient."
The court acknowledged that argument in a death penalty case should not be "unduly re-
strained," and may include "literature, history, science, religion and philosophy." Id. Cf.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203-04 ("open and far ranging argument" called "wise").
What one can expect to find in literature, history, science, religion and philosophy other
than arguments about the propriety of the death penalty, the court did not say.
177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 176. Cf. Utah v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982) (charge approved
that jury must decide whether death penalty is "justified and appropriate in the
circumstances").
179. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
180. Cf. Hertz and Weisberg, supra note 31, at 368-73 (exclusiorf of evidence of lack of
deterrence and nature of retribution proper under character-record-offense formula, but im-
proper under Lockett's general reasoning).
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murder in Furman and Gregg and for rape in Coker v. Georgia,18
a majority of the Court has looked to whether juries generally re-
fuse to impose the penalty in that class of case, even if legally war-
ranted.182 This focus upon jury nullification has figured promi-
nently as well in consideration by the Court of the
constitutionality of death as punishment for felony murder. 83 The
Court's approach recognizes rejection of the death penalty by ju-
ries in a certain class of cases, or even general rejection, as an im-
portant part of eighth amendment analysis.184 Thus, a jury's gen-
eral opposition to the death penalty, or opposition to a particular
aggravating circumstance, is a legitimate consideration for impos-
ing a life sentence. 85 Accordingly, such views represent "factors
which may call for a less severe penalty," and under Lockett, a
statute may not instruct the sentencer to ignore such factors.'"
The Pennsylvania statute in effect instructs the sentencer to ignore
181. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
182. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 339 (Marshall, J., concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
282 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97; cf. id. at 603-04 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting in part). The rejection of automatic death penalty statutes also proceeded
in part from the unwillingness of juries to see capital punishment imposed. See Woodson,
428 U.S. at 295-96, 302-03 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). The role of juries is attributed to
that part of eighth amendment analysis that concerns the society's "contemporary values."
Id. at 181; see also Coker, 433 U.S. at 596.
183. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3375-76 (1982). The issue of the constitution-
ality of death as a punishment for the young was not reached in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102
S. Ct. 869 (1982). The framing of that issue, however, leaves little doubt that jury reaction
will play a substantial role in the ultimate resolution of whether the death penalty for a 16
year old is unconstitutional "in light of contemporary standards." Id. at 874; cf. Woodson,
428 U.S. at 181.
184. For general accounts of the Court's eighth amendment analyses, including the
role of the sentencing jury, see Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1034-56 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Jurisprudence of Death); Liebman and Shepard, supra note 80, at 762-77.
In concluding that death for rape of an adult woman represents a "grossly disproportionate
and excessive punishment," Justice White's plurality opinion sought guidance from "objec-
tive evidence" (including jury verdicts) "of the country's present judgment" on the issue.
Coker, 433 U.S. at 593. Concern with such "objective indicators of society's 'evolving stan-
dards of decency,'" id. at 603 (Powell, J., dissenting in part), commands a majority of the
Court today, though obviously the Justices claim that their own judgment must also be
brought to bear. See id. at 597-600 (White, J., plurality opinion). Cf. infra notes 238-48 and
accompanying text.
185. While Supreme Court references to jury nullification concern general trends
rather than individual cases, I do not see how a valid role for the jury in the aggregate, could
somehow be illegitimate in the particular.
186. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
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such attacks by not permitting a decision based on any considera-
tions beyond mitigating circumstances - mitigating circumstances
that do not appear to encompass general attacks upon the death
penalty or upon aggravating circumstances.18 Thus, the Pennsyl-
vania statute contains an unconstitutional limitation on mitigating
evidence.
The second justification for evidence and argument attacking the
death penalty and aggravating factors is the role Witherspoon v.
Illinois' 88 creates for capital sentencing juries. Witherspoon con-
cerned the power of a state to permit challenges for cause in jury
selection on the grounds of general opposition to the death pen-
alty.1 89 Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, held that such a
broad-based challenge for cause is an unconstitutinal method by
which to constitute a jury that imposes 90 a death penalty.' 9 '
It may be questioned whether Witherspoon applies to post-
Gregg death penalty statutes. The Illinois death penalty statute
187. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
188. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
189. An Illinois statute permitted a challenge for cause to "any juror who shall, on
being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against the death penalty, or that
he is opposed to same." Id. at 512. At Witherspoon's murder trial, "nearly half" of the
venire panel was eliminated by challenges for cause under the statute. Id. at 513.
190. Justice Stewart also held that the petitioner had not established that a jury se-
lected in such a manner was "biased in favor of conviction." Id. at 516-18. The conviction-
proness argument has raged ever since. See White, Death-Qualified Juries: The "Prosecu-
tion-proneness" Argument Reexamined, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 353 (1980). See also Hovey v.
Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). A related controversy
has continued since Witherspoon about whether a death qualified jury can fulfill a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
See Colussi, The Unconstitutionality of Death Qualifying a Jury Prior to the Determina-
tion of Guilt: The Fair-Cross-Section Requirement in Capital Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV.
595 (1982).
191. 391 U.S. at 522. "[W]e hold that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the
jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply
because they voiced general objections to the death penalty, or expressed conscientious or
religious scruples against its infliction." Such a jury was not impartial. Id. at 518.
Justice Stewart did not address the issue of whether the prosecution could use peremp-
tory challenges against potential jurors on a basis broader than that approved in Wither-
spoon for challenges for cause. In Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), Justice White, speak-
ing for the Court, referred to peremptory challenges as a ground for exclusion "having
nothing to do with capital punishment." Id. at 48. Those challenges that do have something
to do with capital punishment must follow Witherspoon. Id. at 49. Thus, in regard to per-
emptory challenges, the prosecution might not be permitted to challenge on the ground of
juror antipathy to the death penalty that does not rise to the standard articulated in
Witherspoon. But see Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 1982).
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gave the jury complete discretion to impose the death penalty.
Under such a system, the jury "can do little more-and must do
nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the
ultimate question of life or death.' 1 92 A jury selection system that
removed potential jurors because of general reservations about the
death penalty could not speak for a community in which a sub-
stantial percentage of people harbor serious doubts.'9 3 All a state
might do'9 " is eliminate for cause potential jurors who make it "un-
mistakably clear" (1) that they would automatically vote against
the death penalty no matter what the evidence or (2) that their
attitudes about the death penalty would prevent an impartial deci-
sion on guilt or innocence. 9 5 Because this holding is premised
upon essentially unlimited discretion to impose the death penalty,
Witherspoon's requirements might not reach post-Gregg statutes
under which sentencers' discretion is supposedly limited.
Adams v. Texas,' 6 a case which applied Witherspoon to the
Texas sentencing statute197 - one in which jury discretion was cer-
tainly limited' - has affirmed a more fundamental role for juror
values under death penalty statutes. Justice White, speaking for
the majority, noted that the capital jury's role in Texas is "more
limited" 99 than under the Illinois system, but concluded that
Witherspoon nevertheless "applies" in full.200 In applying Wither-
spoon to post-Gregg statutes, the Court is assuming that one rule
for the sentencing jury in every capital case is to "express the con-
science of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death."20 l
192. 391 U.S. at 519.
193. Id. at 520.
194. Justice White emphasized that the Witherspoon opinion actually did not provide
grounds for exclusion. Rather Witherspoon is "a limitation on the state's power to exclude."
Adams, 448 U.S. at 48.
195. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21.
196. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
197. Texas required members of the venire to take an oath that the Texas mandatory
death penalty would not "affect [their] deliberations on any issue of fact." Id. at 40 (quoting
Tzx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (1974)). The Court held that alternatives to exclusion for
cause could not be used to exclude potential jurors because of their views on capital punish-
ment, unless such exclusion is no broader than Witherspoon itself. 448 U.S. at 48-49.
198. See supra note 32.
199. 448 U.S. at 46.
200. Id. at 47 & n.4. Thus, the Texas exclusion system must work "consistently" with
the Witherspoon standard.
201. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519-20.
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Witherspoon entitles a capital defendant to make arguments in-
consistent with the Lockett formula. In expressing the commu-
nity's conscience, the Witherspoon opinion entitled the defendant
to jurors who were absolutely opposed to capital punishment in
certain kinds of cases.202 Apparently, therefore, a juror who is op-
posed at the start to one or more aggravating circumstances cannot
be excluded for cause. Furthermore, the state may not exclude per-
sons opposed generally to capital punishment. 03 All that may be
asked is that the juror be willing to consider the prosecution's ar-
guments for death in some types of capital cases. 0 4 Thus, Wither-
202. Members of the venire "cannot be excluded for cause simply because they indi-
cate that there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital
punishment." Id. at 522 n.21. Justice White was not referring by the use of the word "cases"
to homicide versus non-homicide cases. The Illinois exclusion statute applied to murder
only. Id. at 512.
Despite the Supreme Court's rather clear language, two courts appear to have held that
Witherspoon permits challenges for cause to members of the venire who oppose capital pun-
ishment in certain kinds of murder cases, if the potential juror happens to oppose the death
penalty in the type of case that is in fact to be tried by that jury. See Williams v. Maggio,
679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982); Magill v. State, 386 So. 2d 1188, 1189-90 (Fla. 1980). Though
there is a surface appeal to such a position, it contradicts Witherspoon's language directly
and is untrue to Witherspoon's formulation of the role of the jury. In Maggio, for example,
the Court suggested that an exclusion for cause was valid for someone opposed to capital
punishment for robbery-murder. Id. at 386. But a judgment rejecting felony murder as an
appropriate aggravating circumstance represents the way that the jury "maintain[s] a link
between contemporary community values and the penal system. 391 U.S. at 519 n.15.
It is not the jury's role to rubberstamp legislative judgment. The eighth amendment re-
quires that the jury participate in the process by which punishment reflects the commu-
nity's "evolving standards of decency." Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
203. That is, persons who "expressed conscientious or religious scruples against capital
punishment and all who opposed it in principle .... " Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520.
204. The most that can be demanded of a venireman [in regard to his position on
the death penalty] is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by
state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to
vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might
emerge in the course of the proceedings.
Id. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original). See, e.g., Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1300 (5th
Cir. 1979).
There is some doubt upon the continued vitality of this language, based on Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). See 12 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 764, 780-81 n.163 (1981); See also
Comment, Proposals to Balance Interests of the Defendant and State in the Selection of
Capital Juries: A Witherspoon Qualification, 59 N.C.L. REV. 767, 786-88 (1981). Justice
White emphasized the state's legitimate interest in removing for cause jurors who would, or
could, not follow their oath, instructions, or more generally, the law. Adams, 448 U.S. at 45,
48-49. Jurors must be willing to accept death as an acceptable penalty "in certain circum-
stances." Id. at 46. Thus, Texas could require an oath that jurors were willing to follow the
law. Id. at 48-49. This much had already been made clear in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
595-96 (1978) (upholding a similar jury oath).
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spoon gives to the defendant a right to jurors opposed specifically
to an aggravating circumstance and opposed generally on religious
or philosophical grounds to the death penalty. Furthermore, the
language of Witherspoon expressing these views suggests strongly
that jurors may not be precluded from acting upon such views.
20 5
Justice Stewart's reference to Witherspoon in Gregg, specifically
In following a mandatory death penalty statute, however, one is bound to do more than
consider the death penalty; the juror must vote to impose the death penalty if the statutory
conditions are met. Does this mean that juries are no longer to bring their judgments about
capital punishment to bear?
In his dissent in Adams, Justice Rehnquist pointed out the inconsistency in the major-
ity's position that Texas could require fidelity to law but that Witherspoon nevertheless
applies. In Witherspoon, the death penalty statute required discretion and judgment. In
Adams, the Texas statute required little or no jury discretion. The jury was simply to an-
swer objective questions. If the state had a legitimate interest in having jurors follow the
law, views about capital punishment would be irrelevant and Witherspoon would not apply.
Id. at 52-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
By applying Witherspoon in the face of the logic of Justice Rehnquist's dissent, the
majority was denying the right of Texas to give the jury tasks to perform in regard to impos-
ing capital punishment, while insisting that general views on the subject have no role to
play. Justice White referred to the jury role as "not an exact science" and concluded that "a
Texas juror's views about the death penalty might influence the manner in which he per-
forms his role .... " Therefore Witherspoon applied. Id. at 46-47. While this observation
was qualified ("but without exceeding the 'guided jury discretion'. . . permitted him under
Texas law"), the legislature's attempt to remove opinions about capital punishment from
the jury's considerations failed.
How can it be that jurors may be required before the trial to take an oath to obey the
law, but then, because of opposition to the death penalty, may refuse at the sentencing
hearing to obey the literal statute by not answering honestly a clear and objective question
about future danger? See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976); see supra note 31. (If
these questions are answered in affirmative, death penalty is automatic. The only question
about which a defendant will be likely to have an argument, given the murder conviction, is
"whether there is a possibility that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society.") Although the Court's position is un-
clear, I think the reason the Court accepts the inconsistency involves the irrevocability of
excluded jurors' opposition to the death penalty. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
The prosecution is entitled to a presumption that a death penalty statute, even a mandatory
one, represents evolving community standards. Those absolutely unwilling at the beginning
of the trial to defer to this legislative judgment are excluded. But the defendant is then
permitted to attempt to undermine the jury's acceptance of legislative judgment by attacks
on the death penalty. This is why the Court applies Witherspoon even in Texas, where
general views about the death penalty should, by the wording of the statute, have no role to
play in capital sentencing. While Adams may represent an uneasy compromise for the
Court, the case nevertheless supports the right of a defendant in any capital case, under any
statute, to try to influence the jury's "views about the death penalty." Adams, 448 U.S. at
46.
205. The jury is to "speak for the community," Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520, and
"express the conscience of the community," id. at 519.
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his mentioning jury sentencing as a way the death penalty satisfies
the evolving standards of the eighth amendment, 2 0  brings the
Witherspoon apparatus into the minimum requirements for valid
death penalty statutes.0 7 Thus jurors in death penalty cases must
be permitted to return life sentences based upon general opposi-
tion to the death penalty-once contrary arguments are consid-
ered, and also upon absolute opposition to one or more aggravating
circumstances. The Pennsylvania death penalty statute permits
neither choice, and hence is unconstitutional.
Of course these arguments are intended to demonstrate only
that the character-record-offense formula is too narrow. Certainly
it could be reformulated and expanded .20 These arguments do not
undermine the attempt to define irrelevant reasons for a sen-
tencer's decision to impose a life sentence. However, relevance it-
self is a category without substantive content in Supreme Court
death penalty opinions. The Court has failed to articulate a sub-
stantive penalogical theory of who deserves to die. Capital sentenc-
ing decisions as the Supreme Court understands them, rest simply
upon will - the will of the community as expressed by a jury. No
limit of relevance upon the community's will to spare a defendant
is justified by the Court's reasoning in death penalty cases.
B. Exclusion of "Irrelevant" Mitigating Evidence
It is easy to see that any relevance formula that excludes certain
kinds of evidence and argument from a death penalty hearing rests
upon an assumption that some reasons through which a sentencer
might be persuaded to return a life sentence are not appropriate.'"
206. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190.
207. That is not to say that jury sentencing is required in capital cases. Justice Stew-
art called it merely "desirable" in accommodating the eighth amendment requirement of
deference to evolving community standards. See id. Apparently there are other ways. But
when a jury is utilized, Witherspoon defines the jury's role as that of establishing commu-
nity standards.
208. The Pensylvania statute easily could expand the Lockett formula to include chal-
lenges to the death penalty generally and to specific aggravating circumstances. Lockett
does not mandate exclusion of evidence deemed by the court to be irrelevant. See supra
note 146.
209. For example, if polygraph evidence is excluded, it means that a jury should not
be persuaded by such evidence, but might be nevertheless. See Christopher v. State, 407 So.
2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1981). Under Lockett, any evidence not relating to character, record, or




To decide what an appropriate reason is for a life sentence, one
must first have a theory that explains why someone does or does
not deserve to die. The Lockett character-record-offense formula
does not present a persuasive theory of who deserves to die. The
character-record-offense formula is too narrow to permit consider-
ation of all legitimate reasons for returning a life sentence. 10 But
Lockett is also too broad. One can imagine arguments that the
Lockett formula literally would admit that courts probably would
consider improper. With reference to the circumstances of the of-
fense, defense counsel could attempt to argue that the victim in
that case was black or Jewish and that is not as bad as harming
white people. Not only do arguments such as these fit well within
the character-record-offense formulation, but research indicates
that, far from unpersuasive, the race of the defendant and victim
have been a reliable predictor of outcome in death penalty cases. 11
Nevertheless, I do not think that trial courts would permit such
appeals . 21 No doubt Chief Justice Burger also would consider such
appeals improper, and would call them irrelevant, despite the
Lockett formula.
The Georgia Supreme Court has offered, implicitly, simple jury
persuasiveness as an alternative admissibility test to Lockett.21'
State courts occasionally must decide whether to permit a defen-
dant to offer evidence in the sentencing hearing that his parents
love him and would be devastated by his execution. In Houston v.
State,2"  the Tennessee Supreme Court held that such evidence
had been properly excluded under Lockett.21 5 In Cofield v.
State,2 1 6 the prosecution argued that evidence that a mother loves
her son and does not want to see him die did not relate to the
defendant's character or record, nor to the circumstances of the
offense.217 The Georgia Supreme Court avoided the Lockett issue,
210. See supra pt. III, sec. A.
211. See Zeisel, Race Bias In the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida
Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456, 459-60 (1981). But see Excessive Sentencing, supra note
91, at 23-31; id. at 23 n.75; Dade County, supra note 112, at 87-90.
212. Cf. supra notes 158 and 174.
213. See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
214. 593 S.W.2d 267 6Tenn. 1980).
215. Id. at 275. See also State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 (1982); Perry v.
State, 395 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1980).
216. 247 Ga. 98, 272 S.E.2d 530 (1980).
217. Id. at 110, 274 S.E.2d at 542.
1982 145
Duquesne Law Review
but decided that the evidence was admissible nevertheless. 18
The reasoning of the Georgia Supreme Court illustrates the need
for a theory of what it means to deserve the death penalty before
one can decide whether a certain piece of mitigating evidence
should be admissible. The court acknowledged that the defendant
was simply "appealing to the mercy of the jury," but that was not
considered an improper approach to mitigation under the Georgia
statute.21 9 The inference is that whatever causes the jury to extend
mercy is admissible.
The response of the Georgia Supreme Court in Cofield is consis-
tent with the jury's unfettered discretion to return a life sentence
under Georgia's permissive death penalty statute. If the jury is
permitted to return a life sentence for any reason, then any reason
for life must be admissible into evidence.
220
The Tennessee court's refusal to admit similar evidence in Hous-
ton is also consistent with that death penalty statute's structure. A
mandatory statute presumes that some reasons for life are not rele-
vant to the sentencing decision. A mother's love could be one such
irrelevant reason for life, but only if the Tennessee court could ex-
plain why someone who is so loved is as deserving of death as one
who is not. A reference to Lockett is not sufficient because, as ar-
gued above, the Lockett formula does not stand for any such
theory.
Up to this point, and with the exception of relating capital pun-
ishment to causing or intending death,221 courts have failed to
identify any theory of deserving to die, beyond the will of a sen-
tencer. Attempts to describe the concept of mitigating evidence
have, for this reason, yielded either incoherence, or deference to
218. Id. In Cofield, though the trial judge agreed with the prosecutor in front of the
jury that such evidence was not proper mitigating evidence, the evidence was admitted. The
jury was not instructed to disregard the testimony, and defense counsel referred to the testi-
mony in his closing argument. The court held the trial judge's incorrect characterization to
be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
219. Id.
220. This is not to suggest that there is any state court consistency in approaching
admissibility of mitigating evidence. See supra notes 167 and 175-76 and accompanying
text.
221. The United States Supreme Court is, apparently, in the process of establishing an
independent theory of proportionality that limits the death penalty to one who causes, at-
tempts to cause, or intends to cause death. See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3376-79
(1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); cf. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 624 (White, J., concur-
ring); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
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the jury. An example of incoherence is Justice White's reference in
Coker v. Georgia221 to a jury charge that mitigating circumstances
are circumstances "which, in fairness and mercy, may be consid-
ered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability.
'223
While this definition has been repeated,224 it, and others like it, 22 5
define one unknown by reference to another. Such definitions sim-
ply assume that someone, presumably the sentencer, understands
whether someone deserves to die.22
Other courts suggest openly that mitigation is whatever con-
vinces the sentencer to return a life sentence. This was the view of
the Georgia Supreme Court in Cofield. In Spivey v. Zant,227 the
Fifth Circuit misstated the Coker definition of mitigation as "fair-
ness or mercy, ' 2 8 thus perhaps indicating, as in Cofield, that any
persuasive argument that leads to mercy is appropriate. In 1976,
the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted a definition of mitigation
that permitted "the introduction of compassionate or mitigating
factors. '229 The Colorado Supreme Court in 1979, alluding specifi-
cally to jury persuasion as defining mitigation, insisted that miti-
222. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
223. Id. at 591. Justice White was repeating the definition of a mitigating circum-
stance given by the trial court in Coker.
224. See, e.g., Idaho v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 415, 631 P.2d 187, 197 (1981); cf. Spivey
v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 471 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981) (misquoting Coker); see infra notes 227-28 and
accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 100, 282 S.E.2d 439, 446-47 (1981) mitigat-
ing circumstances are:
a fact or groups of facts which do not constitute any justification or excuse for killing
or reduce it to a lesser degree of the crime of first-degree murder, but which may be
considered as extenuating, or reducing the moral culpability of the killing, or making
it less deserving of the extreme punishment than other first-degree murders.
Halsey v. State, 261 Ark. 449, 455, 549 S.W.2d 73, 79 (1977) "[A) mitigating circumstance is
one which does not excuse the offense in question but which, in fairness and mercy, may
justify your imposing less than the maximum possible sentence." See also State v. Hutchins,
303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981).
226. Not all courts agonize over the definition of mitigation. See State v. Groseclose,
615 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tenn. 1981) ("mitigating" is a "word of common usage" and there is
no need for trial judge to define the concept in jury instructions).
227. 661 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1981).
228. Id. at 471 n.8 (emphasis added).
229. Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242, 1253 (Miss. 1976) (reference to "compassionate
or mitigating factors"). The distinction between mitigation and mercy, though not, to my
knowledge, articulated, has a curious resiliance. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976). Perhaps there is an inarticulate feeling among courts that mitigation
may be considered a legal term of art, while mercy or compassion represent an undefinable
grant of grace by jury. Cf. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203, 222.
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gating circumstances must be defined broadly to include "factors
which a jury might. . . consider mitigating and, as a result might
[be] moved to impose a life sentence.
'2 30
A similar result is reached when one attempts to relate the con-
cept of relevant mitigating evidence to the Supreme Court's justifi-
cation for the death penalty. A recent article attempted to define
mitigating circumstances in terms of the Court's opinion in
Gregg.2 3 The death penalty was upheld in Gregg in part because it
served the penalogical goals of retribution and general deter-
rence.2 32 Accordingly, a mitigating circumstance is any information
tending to show that the goals of retribution and deterrence would
not be served by the imposition of capital punishment in a given
case. 233 While this proposal is consistent with the Court's eighth
amendment analysis, the references in Lockett to the "degree of
respect due the uniqueness of the individual ' 234 do not seem com-
patible with sentencing based upon a principle of general deter-
rence, which would sacrifice an individual for the effect the execu-
tion would have upon others..23  Nevertheless, whatever part
deterrence theory ultimately plays,23 Chief Justice Burger would
no doubt assent to a definition of mitigation that links execution to
230. People v. District Court, 196 Colo. 401, 407, 586 P.2d 31, 35 (1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 924 (1979).
231. Liebman and Shepard, supra note 80, at 784-85, 817-21.
232. Liebman and Shepard present their analysis of Gregg in the following terms:
Public attitudes support the death penalty, as does the concept of human dignity. Id. at
763, 766. Substantively, human dignity requires that the death penalty serve recognized
penalogical justification and not be disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. Id.
at 767-68. Procedurally, human dignity requires individualization in sentencing, that is con-
sideration of the defendant's character and record and the circumstances of the offense. Id.
at 772. In addition, there must be legislative guidance of the sentencer's decision. Id. at 773.
There are, of course, other accounts of Gregg and the other July 2nd cases that differ some-
what from this account. See, e.g., Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 31, at 320-22; Jurispru-
dence of Death, supra note 184.
233. Liebman and Shepard, supra note 80, at 810-19.
234. 438 U.S. at 605.
235. See Lempert, supra note 78, at 1187-88. In fact, as Professor Lempert points out,
deterrence, or net social gain, as a basis for supporting capital punishment is attractive pre-
cisely because it disregards the inevitable biases and distortions inherent in the death pen-
alty's administration.
236. The problem with deterrence is, aside from its uninspiring moral foundations,
that it is highly unlikely that capital punishment, as we know the institution today, prevents
any murders at all, and virtually a certainty that it causes more misery than it prevents. See
supra note 235. See also Lempert, supra note 78, at 1187-1225.
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the need for retribution in a particular case.237
But when the Supreme Court discusses retribution 23 8 in capital
cases, the Justices mean merely that the community desires or
does not desire death in a particular case.239 Thus when, in Gregg,
Justice Stewart approved of retribution as a permissible ground for
a legislative determination that the death penalty should exist, he
described the operation of retribution as expressing "the commu-
nity's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an af-
front to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death. 2 40 Justice Stewart further justified retribution
237. It may be that Chief Justice Burger's use of the term "appropriate punishment"
in Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601, does not limit consideration to retribution, but neither is there
any reason to think that retributive principles are not a key element in considering such
appropriateness. See supra note 149. See also Gillers, supra note 3, at 50.
238. Retribution, or "just deserts" as a justification for criminal punishment has en-
joyed a recent resurgence in popularity. See generally Gardner, The Renaissance of Retri-
bution: An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 781. See also R. SINGER, JUST
DESERTs: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING Jus-
TIcE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976). John Braithwaite defines this movement, whether
referred to as retribution or just deserts, as calling for punishment of criminals "because
they deserve to be punished." Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts:. Punishing White-
Collar Criminals, 73 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 723 (1982). Cf. Pelaez, Of Crime-And
Punishment: Sentencing the White-Collar Criminal, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 823 (1980).
239. Ironically, what is missing from Supreme Court capital cases is the very thing
that the Justices claim they must do, judge for themselves whether the death penalty repre-
sents "cruel and unusual punishment." See 1975 Term, supra note 5, at 65. For example,
though acknowledging in Gregg that judges have a role to play because the eighth amend-
ment is a limit on majority power, Justice Stewart made an independent judgment only
about whether death "is disproportionate in relation" to murder. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173,
187. There is no decision by Justice Stewart whether the death penalty is in accordance with
the "dignity of man," an inquiry he acknowledges to be a "proper one," but one which he
reduces to excessiveness. Id. at 173. Professor Radin is right to insist that, pursuant to
moral limits on retributive impulses, "any punishment that fails to respect the personhood
of the offender is unjustified." Super Due Process, supra note 56, at 1164. Justice Stewart
ignores personhood in Gregg. Justice White's opinion in Coker also demonstrates the unwil-
lingess of the Court to examine the death penalty from the perspective of personhood. Jus-
tice White discusses gross disproportionality and excessiveness only, and from the perspec-
tive of an entirely independent judgment, proportionality only. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597. See
infra note 244.
Of course, it may be that Gregg represented an implied holding that the death penalty
is a proper penalty-one that respects human worth. If so, that judgment should have been
argued formally, or at least presented. There is a great deal to be said on the other side.
Super Due Process, supra note 56; Lempert, supra note 80; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
240, 270-74 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
240. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184. The reader should note that Justice Stewart is not making
a claim here about reality or even about his own views. He is not claiming that death is "the
only adequate response" to some crimes, only that the community thinks so. For all we
know, Justice Stewart thinks the community is horribly misguided. Cf. Fletcher, Two Modes
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by pointing out the consequences of frustrating society's instinct
for retribution.4
The Court has not attempted to formulate a theory of retribu-
tion that goes beyond this expression-of-popular-will theme. 242 The
obvious implication of this approach is that if society is satisfied
not to kill someone, retribution would not be served by killing him.
And the fact that retribution would not be served by an execution
appears to be viewed by the Court as a legitimate reason for not
imposing the death penalty.
If the sentencer is conceived of as representative of the commu-
nity's perspective, 24 retribution, and through it the decision to re-
turn a death sentence, loses all substantive content.244 Whenever
the sentencer is convinced that death is not the appropriate pun-
ishment, then by definition, retribution is not served by a death
sentence. Whatever-convinces-the-sentencer becomes the only
proper definition of mitigation.
Such a definition of mitigation leads to essentially open admissi-
bility in death penalty sentencing hearings. To return to Houston,
it may be that presenting evidence of the effect of the defendant's
execution upon his parents is nothing more than an outrageous ap-
of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 972 (1981) (distinguishing first order or substantive
claims from descriptions of the views of others).
241. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. "The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of
man." Id. If the state does not execute horrible murderers, it runs the risk of the breakdown
of reliance on the criminal justice system and the growth of self-help: lynchings, private
revenge and so forth.
242. The Justices have never said, for example, why the murderer who has tortured
his victim deserves to die, but does not deserve to be tortured to death. I am confident the
Court would so hold, but if retribution from the community's viewpoint is a sufficient goal it
is hard to understand why torture might not be an appropriate penalty. Such a penalty
would be proportionate, which is the only independent judgment the Court has rendered.
243. This is certainly how Justice Stewart viewed the jury in Gregg: "The jury also is a
significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values .... " Gregg, 428 U.S. at
181. See also id. at 190. The jury role in death penalty sentencing has in fact been suggested
as a way to keep capital punishment abreast of the eighth amendment's evolving standard.
See, e.g., 1977 Term, supra note 56, at 108.
244. Cf. Justice White's concurrence in the judgments in Lockett, 438 U.S. at 624-26
(White J., concurring) and in Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 643 (1978) (White, J., concurring).
Justice White, citing Coker for the test of cruel and unusual punishment, stated that a
punishment is unconstitutional if (1) it makes no measurable contribution to penalogical
goals, and hence represents needless suffering and (2) if punishment is disproportionate.
Justice White was willing to make his own judgment about satisfaction of the penalogical
goal of deterrence, but not that of retribution. In the case of retribution Justice White




peal to the sympathy of the jury. But retribution, as the Court un-
derstands it, is nothing more than an emotional response by the
community. If the jury is -moved to spare the defendant because of
his mother's plea, then this is the fairest gauge of the extent of the
community's desire for retribution. Similarly, all the many contro-
versies over mitigating evidence, from the co-defendant's plea bar-
gain 4 5 to descriptions of an actual execution,' 4" should be resolved
in favor of admissibility, 47 since all may restrict the community's
desire to inflict the death penalty, which is a factor calling for a
lesser penalty.
2 48
Recognition that any persuasive mitigating evidence must be ad-
mitted into evidence in a death penalty hearing invalidates the
mandatory statute methodology of excluding irrelevant reasons for
death in order to lessen arbitrariness. If retribution is merely an
expression of emotion, the community's "feeling" about what the
defendant deserves, then the only test of relevance is the purely
tautological: what influences the jury is relevant - what does not
influence the jury is not relevant. Thus, no evidence could be ex-
cluded from consideration except upon the ground that the jury
245. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 403 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1981) (plea bargain admitted at
death penalty hearing); Messer v. State, 384 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1981) (plea bargain admissi-
ble); State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979) (co-defendant's sentence admit-
ted at death penalty hearing); State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d 439 (1981) (plea bar-
gain for co-defendant not admissible). Cf. State v. Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d 142 (Tenn. 1981)
(refusal of prosecution to permit defendant to plead not admissible).
246. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979) (description of
execution not admissible); Shriner v. State, 386 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1980) (description of execu-
tion not admissible); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d 666 (1980) (description of
execution not admissible). Cf. State v. Plath, 284 S.E.2d 221 (S.C. 1981) (evidence of elec-
trocution process not admissible). See supra note 174 (cases passing on admissibility of evi-
dence or argument relating to the acceptability of the death penalty as a punishment).
247. A variety of issues have arisen as to what is admissible as mitigating evidence.
See, e.g., Collier v. Georgia, 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979) (exclusion of evidence of
present character not error); Magill v. State, 386 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1980) (present state of
mind may not be relevant).
248. In order to show that such evidence is always admissible, it is not necessary to
assume that if the penalogical value of retribution is not satisfied, deterrence alone is not a
sufficient reason to impose the death penalty in a particular case. In order to be considered
a mitigating circumstance, evidence must only represent a factor calling for a less severe
penalty. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. The fact that a piece of mitigating evidence is not suffi-
cient, even in theory, by itself to require life, is not a ground for exclusion. Thus undermin-
ing retribution is sufficient for admissibility even if deterrence remains an available justifi-
cation. Nevertheless, I doubt that the death penalty would have been upheld if the
uncertain foundation of deterrence had been its only justification. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976).
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would not be influenced by it. No persuasive evidence can be ex-
cluded. There is no impermissible evidence for a mandatory stat-
ute to exclude from consideration.2 4 Any relevance formulation,
such as the one implicitly contained in mitigating factor number
eight of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute, 50 excludes factors
calling for a less severe penalty and creates a capital sentencing
system too unreliable to be constitutional.25'
C. The Requirement of Reasons
There is one remaining aspect of the Pennsylvania death penalty
statute to be discussed. Even if the Pennsylvania statute admitted
all evidence and arguments sought to be introduced and argued by
a capital defendant, the Pennsylvania statute would still be uncon-
stitutional because it requires death unless the jury finds the pres-
ence of a mitigating circumstance.2 "
The effect of this provision is to require more than the presence
of a mitigating circumstance. The Pennsylvania statute requires
that a juror be able to articulate a mitigating circumstance8 3 and
find it proved by a preponderance of the evidence2" before the cir-
249. The exclusion of evidence considered irrelevant, and the requirement that the
sentencer base the decision of life and death only on aggravating and mitigating evidence
admitted into evidence and charged in instructions is the major difference between
mandatory and permissive death penalty statutes. See supra notes 154-69 and accompany-
ing text.
250. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1982): "Any. . .evidence
• .. concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his
offense." See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
251. Exclusion of such evidence violates Lockett's "first promise," that the defendant
may introduce into evidence and argue to the sentence any leigimate argument for life. See
supra notes 131-39, 171-73 and accompanying text. Since any persuasive evidence is legiti-
mate, none can be excluded.
252. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(iv) (Purdon Supp. 1982) (the sentence
must be death if aggravating circumstances found outweigh mitigating circumstances found,
or, if aggravating circumstances but no mitigating circumstances are found). See supra
notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
253. Articulation requires that the mitigating circumstance be the subject of proof at
thi sentencing hearing; that is, someone other than the sentencer must consider the evi-
dence to be mitigating. See Miller v. State, 605 S.W.2d 430, 438 (Ark. 1980) (trial judge
should charge only aggravating and mitigating circumstances as to which there is some evi-
dence). The requirement of finding a mitigating circumstance also means that the sentencer
must himself consciously recognize the factor. See State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 134, 292 S.E.2d
203, 236 (1982) (Exum, J., dissenting) (mitigation may be "inarticulable" and "intangible").
See infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
254. The requirement of proof can be a serious hurdle. See, e.g., Ruiz v. State, 265
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cumstance may serve as a basis for returning a life sentence. That
is, the statute requires evidence of the juror's mental process. The
statute presumes rational discourse in evaluation of the sen-
tence.25 5 This discourse is to include all relevant, that is, all per-
suasive, information. It presumes the jury able to describe the fac-
tors influencing their judgment.25 6  It also presumes that the
reasons given are the "real" reasons for the decision.
There is serious doubt as to the accuracy of this model of human
decision-making. Karl Llewellyn recognized the uncertain role
played by reasons for decision in the context of appellate decision-
making in The Common Law Tradition:
[P]sychologists began to look into how people go about reaching decisions
... .Roughly they arrived at the conclusion that. . it was seldom that
the actual deciding was done by way of formal and accurate deduction in
the manner of formal logic. The common process was rather one either of
sudden intuition - a leap to some result that eased the tension; or else it
was one of successive mental experiments as imagination developed and
passed in review various possibilities until one or more turned up which had
appeal. In any ordinary case a reasoned justification for the result repre-
sented a subsequent job, testing the decision against experience and against
acceptability, buttressing it and making it persuasive to self and others. 57
Llewellyn doubted that a "well reasoned decision" could mean "a
reasoned and rational deciding."'2"8
Does the Supreme Court believe that the average juror can state,
or even know, why he or she votes for life imprisonment? It is
more likely that a juror goes into the jury room with a "feeling"
Ark. 875, 881, 617 S.W.2d 6, 12 (1981) (emotional disturbance not proved); McCrea v. State,
395 So. 2d 1145, 1155 (Fla. 1980) (mental state evidence rejected as lacking medical cer-
tainty); State v. Smith, 131 Ariz. 29, 31-32, 638 P.2d 696, 698-99 (1981) (mental impairment
not proved); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 953 (Fla. 1981) (influence of drugs and alcohol
not proved).
255. With delicious irony, whether intended or not, one student note refers to guided
discretion statutes as creating a "rationalized sentencing process." Review of Supreme
Court Decisions, supra note 80, at 261. The Supreme Court has made much the same claim.
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
256. Cf. State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 221, 283 S.E.2d 732, 752 (1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1741 (1982) (court agrees that requirement of specification of mitigating circum-
stances found might inhibit jury's full consideration of "other mitigating circumstances");
State v. Moore, 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982) (prosecution argument that specifica-
tion of mitigating circumstances harms defendant).
257. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, 11 (1960).
258. Id.
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whether the death penalty should be imposed.5 9 Under a permis-
sive statute, if a juror does not wish to impose the death penalty,
the juror may simply state the wish and refuse to vote for death.
Under the Pennsylvania statute, however, the refusal of such a ju-
ror to vote for death would be a violation of the obligation to obey




The reader should note the premium the Pennsylvania statute
places on verbal skills. A juror's sense of dread always may be
placed verbally into an appropriate mitigating category, if the juror
has the necessary verbal skill. For example, the juror, just before
retiring to deliberate, may have caught the eye of the defendant
and, for the first time, may have recognized the defendant as a
fellow human being. The juror may have felt a bond of kinship
with the defendant at that moment that rendered the death pen-
alty an impossible choice.22 A verbally articulate juror might say
of such a feeling, "I have become convinced from all the evidence
that the act was a product of the defendant's deprived history and
259. See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1376 n.57 (5th Cir. 1981) (jury's "sub-
jective, unarticulated perceptions" as mitigation). See also State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 210, 221,
283 S.E.2d 732, 752 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1741 (1982) (court agrees that require-
ment of specification of mitigating circumstances found might inhibit jury's full considera-
tion of "other mitigating circumstances"); State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 34, 292 S.E.2d 203, 236
(1982) (Exum, J., dissenting) (mitigation may be "inarticulable" and "intangible").
260. A particular jury's "willingness to act lawlessly" has not been considered a relia-
ble basis for determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. See Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
261. The Supreme Court, or at least the plurality supporting guided discretion stat-
utes, assume that sentencers will know the reasons for their decisions. Mandatory statutes,
which limit the grounds upon which the sentencer may decide upon a life sentence, make
the same assumption about mitigating circumstances. But if sentencers do not know why
they are inclined either for a life sentence, or for the death penalty, these required refer-
ences to specified, or charged, circumstances are more a facade than the description of deci-
sion-making they purport to be. Running a risk of an inability to specify an appropriate
mitigating circumstance, when such specification may be unrelated to the information actu-
ally influencing the sentencer, certainly introduces a risk that an inappropriate sentence will
be given. While I do not make any claim of sufficient scientific research in this area, there is
at least some reliable indication that in fact we are highly inaccurate in knowing, and re-
porting what factors influence our decision-making. See Nisbett and Wilson, Telling More
Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOLOGIcAL REV. 231
(1977).
262. The process of somehow humanizing the defendant is recommended by exper-
ienced capital trial attorneys as the most effective death penalty hearing strategy. See, e.g.,
Balske, New Strategies For The Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REV. 331, 332, 356
(1979).
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that he can be treated and reformed, and I consider this a mitigat-
ing circumstance of such importance that it outweighs the aggra-
vating circumstances." Another juror, not so articulate, might
stand mute, haunted by the defendant's look but unable to manu-
facture a reason for life. Jurors may experience mercy simply as a
whim.263
Supreme Court precedent recognizes that mitigation really is not
a "fact" to be proven. In his concurrence in Gregg, cited by Chief
Justice Burger in Lockett, Justice White noted that there may be
mitigating circumstances "too intangible" to be listed in a death
penalty statute.264 This may be the reason why Justice Stewart dis-
tinguished in Woodson between "compassionate" and "mitigating"
factors while asserting that a jury could not be precluded from
considering either in deciding whether to inflict capital punish-
ment.266 A look, a feeling, a doubt,266 a general attitude of generos-
ity and solidarity in the face of death - these are all intangible to
be sure .2 " But in the end they may be the most persuasive, though
unarticulated, factors to a juror.2 "
The requirement of a reason does not alter the willingness or
unwillingness of a juror to impose a sentence of death. If under
Supreme Court precedent deserving a life sentence means simply
that the sentencer wishes to impose it, 269 the requirement of a rea-
son adds nothing of value to the sentencer's decision. If the sen-
263. See Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 579-81 & n.23 (5th Cir. 1981) ("whimsical
doubt" may serve as basis for a recommendation of mercy).
264. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 600 n.4 (1978) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 222 (White, J., concurring)).
265. 428 U.S. at 304. See supra note 229.
266. See Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 579-81 (5th Cir. 1981); id. at 581 n.23; Gray
v. Mississippi, 375 So. 2d 994 (Miss. 1979).
267. See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1375-76 & n.57 (5th Cir. 1981); ("The
exercise of mercy, of course, can never be a wholly rational, calculated, and logical process."
The court did not reach the issue whether Lockett applies "when there are no objective,
articulable, nonstatutory mitigating factors."). See also People v. District Court, 196 Colo.
401, 407, 586 P.2d 31, 35 (1978).
268. Mitigation is generally viewed as involving judgment rather than proof. Thus,
courts have held that judging the propriety of capital punishment is not the same as proving
elements of an offense for purposes of the burden of proof. See State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho
405, 417, 631 P.2d 187, 199 (1981); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 711-13, 415 A.2d 830, 848-
50 (1980); State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 446-47, 586 P.2d 1253, 1258-59 (1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979). See generally Burden of Proof, supra note 3, at 338, 341. Of
course mitigation may be premised upon the establishment of certain facts. See, e.g., State
v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 100, 282 S.E.2d 439, 446-47 (1981).
269. See supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text.
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tencer nevertheless gives the death penalty because of inability or
unwillingness to specify a reason for mitigation, the defendant has
been given the wrong sentence.27 0 If, on the other hand, the Court
continues to insist that there are relevant and irrelevant reasons
for a life sentence, the requirement of a reason still will not im-
prove sentencing. There is no way even for the juror to know
whether the juror's hesitance to impose death stems from a rele-
vant or irrelevant consideration.
CONCLUSION: FURMAN v. GEORGIA VERSUS MCGAUTHA V.
CALIFORNIA
The attack on reasons for imposing a capital sentence does more
than disqualify mandatory sentencing and more than require per-
missive sentencing statutes which leave ultimate discretion to
spare a defendant in the sentencer. Permissive death penalty stat-
utes themselves are justified, as in Gregg, by reference to aggravat-
ing circumstances that are said to represent the reasons death is
imposed. 71 But if juries and judges can never really know the rea-
sons for their death penalty judgments, then aggravating circum-
stances no more explain a sentencer's decision than do mitigating
ones. Gregg is premised on the proposition that at least the se-
lection for death can be based on reason even if mitigation cannot
be. But there is little hope for a "meaningful basis" of decision
from a statutory list of aggravating circumstances.
The Court continues to be preoccupied by the radically different
paths represented by Furman v. Georgia and McGautha v. Cali-
fornia s.2 7  Furman promised that persons would not be executed
without rational justification. 4 McGautha permitted "untram-
270. Cf. supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
271. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98.
272. See supra note 260.
273. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). Unlimited sentencer discretion in capital sentencing was
challenged on due process grounds. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196. A companion challenge
argued that bifurcated proceedings were required in capital cases. Id. at 208-20. Justice
Harlan rejected this claim as well. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, concluded that
drawing up a list of aggravating circumstances is a task "which [is] beyond present human
ability." Id. at 204. Justice Harlan had confidence that a sentencing jury would "act with
due regard for the consequences." Id. at 208. For an account of the relationship between
McGautha and Furman, see Lanza-Danduce, Formality, Neutrality, and Goal-Rationality:
The Legacy of Weber in Analyzing Legal Thought, 73 J. C& A. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 533, 545
n.35 (1982).
274. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
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meled discretion" in the decision to impose death. 75 Gregg's ap-
proval of aggravating circumstances along with open mitigation
represents an attempt to have both reason and discretion.
Mandatory sentencing that follows Lockett represents another
such attempt. One may doubt whether both goals can be obtained
in one death penalty statute.
The Court has not considered the more serious problem that
Furman's requirement of reason perhaps cannot be satisfied at all.
We just do not know why juries and judges impose the death pen-
alty. Guided discretion presents merely the illusion of a rational
process. The only choice in death penalty law may be the "awe-
some responsibility"2 6 of absolute discretion or an end to capital
punishment.*
275. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207.
276. Id. at 208.
* As this article was going to print, the Georgia Supreme Court answered the question
certified in Zant v. Stephens, 102 S. Ct. 1856 (1982), concerning the practice of the Georgia
Supreme Court in affirming judgments of death in cases in which multiple statutory aggra-
vating circumstances are found by the finder of fact, one or more of which findings are
reversed on appeal. The Georgia Supreme Court stated that statutory aggravating circum-
stances serve the role only of determining those murder cases in which death is a potential
penalty. As long as at least one statutory aggravating circumstance is found validly, the case
remains a potentially capital one. The actual decision to impose the penalty of death is
made in the discretion of the factfinder, without further reference to statutory aggravating
factors as such. Zant v. Stephens, No. 38,763 (Ga. Oct. 27, 1982).
The Georgia Supreme Court's candor reveals that the hope that specified aggravating
circumstances would channel sentencer discretion in the death penalty decision was mis-
guided. Once one aggravating circumstance is found, the sentencer in Georgia has essentially
unlimited discretion with regard both to mitigating and aggravating factors. Such a system
echoes Justice Harlan's position in McGuatha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), favoring
sentencer discretion once guilt was determined in a capital crime.

